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Abstract 
Measuring smallholder competitiveness in the tomato value chain in Cambodia: 
A transaction costs perspective 
by 
Narith Roeun 
Smallholders in developing countries face many challenges in participating in high-value agri-
food value chains. High transaction costs are an important constraint, but there is little in the 
value chain literature that quantifies these effects. While Cambodia has an agriculturally-
based economy with a strong demand for vegetables, it relies on tomatoes imported from 
neighbouring countries, namely Vietnam and Thailand. Given that Cambodia has comparably 
favourable climatic conditions, an important research gap concerns why Cambodian 
smallholder farmers cannot competitively supply these markets. This study hypothesises that 
transaction costs are an important source of low competitiveness for Cambodian 
smallholders. There are three main objectives in this study: 1) to characterise the trade and 
marketing patterns of the tomato value chain in Cambodia; 2) to quantify the transaction costs 
that affect the competitiveness of tomato smallholders; and 3) to examine and quantify the 
role that alternative governance mechanisms could play in reducing transaction costs. This 
study uses a combination of value chain analysis (VCA) with the policy analysis matrix (PAM) 
to address transaction costs in value chains, adding value to both types of analysis. Data used 
for the computation and analysis were collected from focus groups, key informants, and 
available secondary sources.  
This research revealed interesting results contributing to the research gaps. There is a high 
level of transaction costs faced by tomato smallholders in Cambodia as a result of loose 
coordination in the domestic tomato value chain. The adapted PAM result indicates that 
iii 
profits at private prices (which include transactions costs) are substantially lower than optimal 
profits at social prices, with transactions costs reducing private profits by almost 60 percent.  
Computations of domestic resource costs (DRC) indicate that tomato production has a 
comparative advantage over imports, even in the baseline. However, a variety of market 
failures hurt the ability of smallholders to capitalise on this. Based on this result, farmers are 
encouraged to move to one of two alternative models which have a comparative advantage 
over the currently prevailing market-based governance structure. The first one is a structure 
where a sponsor provides advanced technology and collateral-free credit, and uses informal 
contracts in vertically coordinating both inputs and output transactions. The second structure 
relies on formal contracts with farmers as well as a vertical integration of input supply and 
targets a domestic niche market. Model results show that these two models can bring about 
higher profits for smallholders, lead firms and the sponsor.  
Keywords: Value chain; smallholders; competitiveness; transaction costs; policy analysis 
matrix 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background for the study 
Smallholders in developing countries face many challenges which hinder their participation in 
high-value agri-food markets. Some of these factors include a lack of economies of scale (Kydd, 
Pearce, & Stockbridge, 1997; Narrod et al. (2009, p. 1086)) resulting from limitations in 
resources such as land and labour (Pearson, Gotsch, & Balhri, 2003), poor physical 
infrastructure (Pearson et al., 2003; Reardon, Barrett, Berdegue, & Swinnen, 2008; Reardon & 
Timmer, 2007; Sok, Chap, & Chheang, 2011), underdeveloped institutional arrangements 
(Narrod et al., 2009; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2007; Trienekens, 2011), high and rising quality 
standards (Narrod et al., 2009; Sok et al., 2011), low technology (Pearson et al., 2003; Sartorius 
& Kirsten, 2007), lack of access to credit (capital) (Dolan, Humphrey, & Harris-Pascal, 1999; 
Pearson et al., 2003; Reardon et al., 2008), lack of reputation or brand (Narrod et al., 2009; 
Reardon & Timmer, 2007); and high transaction costs (Azam, Imai, & Gaiha, 2012; Gong, 
Parton, Cox, & Zhou, 2007; Key, Sadoulet, & De Janvry, 2000; Renkow, Hallstrom, & Karangja, 
2004; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2007; Vakis, Sadoulet, & De Janvry, 2003). These constraints limit 
the ability of smallholders to raise their profitability through new income-generating 
opportunities, making it difficult for them to escape from poverty.  
In the last two decades, the Cambodian government has instituted a range of regulatory 
frameworks including laws, decrees and sub-decrees (Prakas in Khmer) to develop the 
agricultural sector for the purpose of improving rural farmer livelihoods. They include Land 
Law 2001, Sub-decree on Social Land Concessions (No. 19 ANK/BK/ March 19, 2003); Strategy 
for the Improvement of the Agricultural Market Information Service 2006; Seed Law 2009; 
Policy Paper on the Promotion of Paddy Production and Rice Export 2010; Sub-decree (Prakas 
in Khmer) on Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) 2010; Sub-decree on Contract Farming 2011; 
Law on Pesticide and Chemical Fertiliser Control 2012; Law on Agricultural Cooperatives 2013; 
Agricultural Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018; Agricultural Extension Policy 2015; 
Financial Services-Related Policies for Smallholders; and a draft of a Law on Food Safety in 
February 2016 (Nuppun, 2016).  
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However, smallholders have not been able to access these opportunities. Despite the 
decrease in the proportion of poor people from 53 percent in 2004 to 20.5 percent in 2011 
(Nuppun, 2016), 8.1 million people earn just above the poverty line, set at USD 2.50 per day 
(The World Bank, 2014), and the majority of the poor and near-poor are farmers (The World 
Bank, 2015). There is also a downward trend in the annual growth rate of the agricultural 
sector in this 10-year period, slowing from 5.3 percent in 2004 to 1 percent in 2014 (The World 
Bank, 2015). In addition, despite the policy support given to agriculture, Cambodia is still a 
large importer of agricultural products, and interestingly, according to the FAO (2014), 
vegetables are among the top three imported agricultural commodities in Cambodia. CRDI 
(2011, p. 6) states that “Cambodia benefits least and is less competitive than the other ASEAN 
countries in agricultural trade.”     
1.2 Rationale for the study  
While developing countries focus a great deal of attention on producing cereal crops such as 
rice and maize, Weinberger and Lumpkin (2007) argued that the diversification of the 
agricultural sector into vegetables is more beneficial for farmers given their higher value. The 
World Bank (2015) indicated that there are higher profits in vegetable production in 
comparison with other crops. In this sense, the vegetable sector has a significant role to play 
in poverty reduction. In comparison to other crops, it is much easier for smallholders to 
participate in the vegetable sector as vegetables can be grown in small plots of land and have 
shorter production cycles (Nuppun, 2016). The Royal Government of Cambodia also has a 
priority to promote rural incomes through crop diversification which is clearly stated in the 
fourth angle of rectangular strategy. Based on these arguments, it is important to analyse and 
quantify the constraints that occur in vegetable value chains to determine possible 
opportunities for smallholder farmers.  
In the case of Cambodia, one would expect smallholders to be competitive in the vegetable 
value chain. A number of studies have confirmed that Cambodian agriculture has a 
comparative advantage, due to good soil, weather, water sources, and low labour costs, over 
its regional competitors (Gunjal, Sheinkman, Burja, Jeong, & Long, 2012; Intal, Oum, & 
Simorangkir, 2008; Sok et al., 2011). Cambodian smallholders have also received significant 
support in relation to agricultural technology improvement in the last two decades (Royal 
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Government of Cambodia, 2011, 2014; The World Bank, 2015). In addition, the government 
imposes zero tariffs on imported agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and 
agricultural equipment (Hem, 2012), and does not distort markets through direct 
interventions associated with input and output subsidies (The World Bank, 2015). Despite this, 
Cambodia remains a net importer of most vegetable products, suggesting other constraints 
might limit the ability of Cambodian farmers to successfully meet this growing demand.  
This research study will measure the competitiveness of smallholder vegetable producers vis-
à-vis imported products, by identifying and quantifying transaction costs incurred in the 
exchange between smallholders and other key players in the vegetable supply chain in 
Cambodia, using a case study of tomatoes. The hypothesis of this study is that tomato 
smallholders in this country face high transaction costs leading to low profitability in tomato 
production. This reduces the competitiveness of smallholders relative to imported products. 
1.3 Research objective and research questions 
The main question to be answered by this study is “Why is Cambodia unable to competitively 
satisfy domestic demand for tomatoes, and is instead reliant on imported products?” To 
answer this question, the research has three main objectives. The first objective is to 
understand the structure and practice of tomato value chains in Cambodia. Insights into key 
stakeholders and their relationship patterns will help in understanding the flow of products 
and finance, the distribution of benefits among value chain actors, the governance of 
transactions, and different actors’ roles in adding to or reducing value from the product. The 
second objective is to quantify the transaction costs that affect the competitiveness of 
smallholder vegetable farmers. As this study hypothesises that low competitiveness results 
from high costs which are induced by high transaction costs, it is necessary to identify and 
quantify these types of costs and analyse their influence on profitability. The third objective is 
to examine and quantify the role that alternative governance mechanisms could play in 
reducing transaction costs.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature and the Theoretical Framework 
In this section, a review is provided of relevant theoretical and applied literature on value 
chains to illustrate the issues associated with competitiveness and transaction costs that 
influence the Cambodian vegetable value chain. The first part provides an overview of 
Cambodian agriculture and its vegetable sector. The second part reviews the definitions of 
and relationships between value chain characteristics, competitiveness and governance 
structures, while the third part is dedicated to discussing in more detail the notion of 
transaction costs and their theoretical drivers, as well as empirical measurement. The last part 
is motivated by the use of the policy analysis matrix as a means to quantify transaction cost 
issues in value chains.  
2.1 An overview of the vegetable sector in Cambodia 
2.1.1 General background of Cambodia 
Cambodia is a developing country where about one-third of its economy depends on 
agriculture (CDRI, 2011; Dynamic Alliance Consulting, 2011; Gunjal et al., 2012; Sok et al., 
2011; The World Bank, 2015; Theng & Koy, 2011; UNDP, 2013). The agricultural sector is 
responsible for employing around 70% (FAO, 2014; Royal Government of Cambodia, 2014) of 
the total population of 15.4 million (FAO, 2015). Cambodian agriculture is dominated by 
smallholder farmers who have less than two hectares of land (FAO, 2014). Because of this, the 
target of poverty alleviation participated in by development agencies, including the 
government, is the rural areas, and the agricultural sector is a significant part, at 60 percent 
of poverty reduction (The World Bank, 2015). Since 2008, agriculture has been promoted and 
identified as a prominent sector of the government’s development strategy (Gunjal et al., 
2012). 
A common thread in all of these policies in relation to the agricultural sector is the 
improvement of agricultural productivity and diversification for economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The government, however, maintains a relatively small budget for the agricultural 
sector at around 1.5% of total GDP per year (The World Bank, 2011), with much of the support 
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for agriculture funded by local and international development agencies (FAO, 2014; Intal et 
al., 2008). 
After becoming a member of the United Nations in 1955, Cambodia has subsequently joined 
both regional and global organizations with the main purpose of promoting trade, especially 
increasing exports. For instance, it became a member of ASEAN in 1999 and the WTO in 2004.  
After decades of civil wars, Cambodia reformed its economy along free market guidelines in 
1993 (Em, Yutaka, Fukuda, & Kai, 2007). Its major export products comprise of textiles and 
clothes, rice, rubber, maize and cassava, yet nearly all agricultural products are exported as 
raw products (Gunjal et al., 2012). However, this country still largely depends on the import 
of agricultural products, including both fresh and value added products and high value 
vegetables (FAO, 2014, 2015; Gunjal et al., 2012).  
2.1.2 The vegetable sector in Cambodia 
Vegetables are considered as one of the agricultural crops (along with staple goods such as 
cassava, maize, soy beans and mungbeans) that can be grown on small sized farms in 
Cambodia (Gunjal et al., 2012). Compared to other crops, vegetables in Cambodia have the 
highest average farm gross margin of US$ 1,393 per hectare, about five times higher than that 
of rice (The World Bank, 2015). Given government policies promoting crop diversification, the 
area of vegetable cultivation and its yield saw an increasing trend from 2005 to 2012, while 
there was a slight decrease in both planting area and yield from 2013 (Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1: Aggregate vegetable production in Cambodia from 2000 to 2014 
Source: FAOSTAT, assessed on February 25, 2017 
The trade value of all vegetables has been increasing for both imports and exports since 2007. 
It is notable that the export value of vegetables as a product class1 are markedly higher than 
that of imports in the last five years. Imports increased from USD 1,858,519 in 2012 to USD 
3,508,638 in 2016. Exports, on the other hand, have grown significantly since 2012 (from USD 
8,337,853 to USD 21,431,408 in 2016), with stable to declining levels between 2014 and 2016 
(Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2: Vegetable trade in Cambodia in a ten-year period from 2007 to 2016 
 Year Import Export 
2007 505,607 1,170,974 
2008 1,170,974 493,178 
2009 2,388,145 1,007,019 
2010 1,847,516 835,575 
2011 2,531,892 2,531,417 
2012 1,858,519 8,337,853 
2013 4,199,174 13,076,746 
2014 3,434,092 23,379,030 
2015 2,109,516 22,475,053 
2016 3,508,638 21,431,408 
Source: www.comtrade.un.org, accessed on January 18, 2018 
                                                             
1 Vegetables are defined as products found in Chapter 7 of the Harmonized Schedule for the classification of 
international trade data.  
Year Cultivated area (ha) Yield (kg/ ha) Total production (t) 
2000 74,040 64,175 475,150 
2001 76,000 62,237 473,000 
2002 74,499 63,759 475,000 
2003 75,738 63,731 482,685 
2004 76,116 63,742 485,179 
2005 77,000 62,500 481,250 
2006 75,690 63,549 481,000 
2007 78,000 62,436 487,000 
2008 79,157 63,651 503,847 
2009 82,413 63,756 525,436 
2010 85,273 63,862 544,569 
2011 88,329 63,968 565,022 
2012 96,000 65,417 628,000 
2013 94,677 64,063 606,533 
2014 83,646 64,100 536,170 
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While the trade in vegetables seems to suggest a change in Cambodia’s status from a net 
importer to a net exporter, a closer inspection of the data reveals something different. Based 
on the available data reported by UN Comtrade (Table 2.3), the increase in exports has been 
driven almost entirely by the significant surge in exports of cassava, which are part of the trade 
classification in Table 2 but not always considered as a vegetable variety in some reports (FAO, 
2014; Nuppun, 2016; SNV, 2014; The World Bank, 2015; Weinberger & Lumpkin, 2007) and in 
this thesis. By contrast, imports of more traditional types of vegetables have been rising. 
Among high value vegetables, tomatoes also have a trade imbalance, with no exports and 
rising imports to meet domestic demand. However, based on UN Comtrade data, the import 
values are considerably small. Nuppun (2016) reported that there is inconsistency of vegetable 
data used in reports of different organisations, and there is a large underreported data of both 
formal and informal trade of vegetables in Cambodia, suggesting a need for the improvement 
of trade statistics.   
Table 2.3: Trade flow and value of specific types of vegetables 
Types of crops 
Trade flow Years/ USD 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Potatoes Import 3,466 710 163 22,187 19,407 
  Export - - - - - 
Tomatoes Import 7,368 7,506 15,223 14,227 9,929 
  Export - - - - - 
Onions Import 422,211 1,227,085 589,091 461,243 1,181,192 
  Export - - - - - 
Cabbages Import 115,657 265,359 114,615 175,710 467,083 
  Export - - - - - 
Lettuces Import 6,005 7,648 33,581 16,850 28,097 
  Export - - - - - 
Cucumbers Import 1,113 1,154 - - 57 
  Export - - - - - 
Other vegetables Import 7,591 29,107 62,323 65,691 122,003 
  Export 209,461 77,430 43,881 70,243 73,271 
Cassava Import 61  - 13,576 4,767 2,169 
  Export 7,779,471 12,989,040 23,290,862 22,379,067 21,333,132 
Source: www.comtrade.un.org, accessed on January 18, 2018 
2.1.3 General aspects of vegetable value chains in Cambodia 
The lack of scholarly work on agri-food value chains in Cambodia is a great challenge for this 
review, and this is considered an important research gap. Because of this issue, most of the 
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information collected here is drawn from reports produced by several non-profit 
organizations (NGOs) working in relevant areas.  
Cambodian farmers find it difficult to meet domestic market demand even though Cambodia 
is situated in a favourable geographic location with good climatic conditions (Chhean, Diep, & 
Moustier, 2004; Gunjal et al., 2012; Intal et al., 2008; Palada et al., 2008; Sok et al., 2011). The 
Mekong River is the main water source. The climate is also favourable for planting tropical 
vegetables given average weather conditions ranging from 25-30 degrees Celsius (Palada et 
al., 2008). Some possible reasons for farmers having low profits from their vegetable farming 
are the use of traditional technology (for watering and practice) and vegetable varieties do 
not match the preferences of domestic consumers (Palada et al., 2008). The agricultural sector 
in Cambodia in all stages of the value chain lacks domestic investment (Hem, 2012) and 
Cambodian farmers generally have small plots of land for vegetable production. The high 
seasonality of domestic vegetable production also reduces competitiveness (Nuppun, 2016; 
SNV, 2014). However, Palada et al. (2008) pointed out that Cambodian vegetable growers 
have a huge opportunity to improve their vegetable yields by improving their technology in 
water management and cultivation practices.   
There have been a few reports focusing on the vegetable sector in the Cambodian context in 
the last two decades. The brief discussion of those value chain studies is provided below.  
There is mixed evidence regarding the structure of vegetable supply chains in Phnom Penh, 
the capital city of Cambodia. According to Chhean et al. (2004), vegetable supply chains in the 
study area are short, in which retailers directly communicate and coordinate with producers. 
This indicates an absence of middlemen playing their role in the value chain. Aside from buying 
domestic vegetables to supply increasing vegetable demand, retailers, and wholesalers in 
Phnom Penh city, which is the largest vegetable market in Cambodia, need to import 
vegetables from neighbouring countries. These imports mainly come from Vietnam which 
supplies up to 91% of the total volume of vegetables sold in Phnom Penh (Chhean et al., 2004). 
Kusakabe (2006) found different results compared to Chhean et al. (2004), noting that there 
are a number of important actors in the vegetable supply chain in Cambodia such as producers 
(farmers), local collectors, local markets, wholesalers in public markets, retailers with stalls, 
micro vendors, traders outside public markets and consumers. However, this analysis lacks an 
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adequate description of the governance structures or types of trading relationships used 
between actors in this chain. There are a number of challenges which cause poor institutional 
arrangements in the agricultural sector in Cambodia, including the lack of human resources in 
cooperatives, limited promotion from government and development agencies, lack of 
knowledge in running businesses, infrastructure constraints (lack of warehouses and 
marketing facilities), lack of training in cooperative management, capital constraints for 
farmers, and low trust from financial institutions or banks (Heifer International, 2011). 
SNV (2014) stated that all vegetables in Cambodia are based on the same value chain. This 
means that all actors are transacting in non-specific vegetables. They trade all type of 
vegetables that are available and marketable and none of the actors in the vegetable value 
chain in Cambodia transacts in only a specific type of vegetable. The inconsistency of supply 
leads to a lack of trust among downstream actors, especially wholesalers which causes 
considerable reliance on imported vegetables. SNV (2014) also found that all vegetable 
transactions between actors from upstream to downstream depend on informal relationships.  
Nuppun (2016) published the most recent report on the vegetable sector in Cambodia. In this 
report, vegetables traded in the Cambodian market are mainly from two different channels: 
domestic products and imported products. In total, these two channels supply around 0.93 
million tonnes of vegetables, 56 percent of which are sourced from neighbouring countries 
and another 44 percent are the domestically produced vegetables. In terms of the value chain 
actors, it is similar to that which Chhean et al. (2004) has reported. Nuppun (2016) indicated 
that the vegetable value chain in Cambodia is largely informal and simple by nature and 
roughly 10 percent of farmers are members of agricultural communities, farmer organizations 
or cooperatives. Additionally, these institutional arrangements have been found to have 
weaknesses associated with coordination and failure in linking smallholder vegetables with 
the market. In relation to contractual arrangements, it is reported that there are no written 
contracts found in the relationship between all actors from upstream to downstream of the 
vegetable value chains in Cambodia.   
In summary, the above studies present the following reasons for the low profitability of 
vegetable farming in Cambodia. The use of traditional technology results in low yields, leading 
to low returns. The inconsistent supplies of domestic vegetables creates needs for imported 
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products. There is also the considerable challenge faced by farmers because of the absence of 
market coordination in most parts of the country, or the existing institutional arrangement is 
inadequate to link farmers to market places.   
However, based on this review of the general aspects of the value chain, it is concluded that 
none of the previous research relevant to vegetable value chains provides a deep discussion 
in terms of transaction costs and competitiveness. At the same time, there is no consistent 
view of the vegetable value chains in Cambodia, either. These findings underline the research 
gap that this thesis aims to fill.   
2.2  Theoretical framework 
2.2.1 Value chain analysis 
The concept of the value chain (VC) was first defined by Porter (1985, p. 36) as “a collection of 
activities that are performed to design, produce, market, deliver, and support products.” 
Porter’s concept of the value chain was at the level of the individual firm, which seeks to gain 
competitive advantage by using its primary and support activities to add value in the given 
competitive structure of its industry. Primary activities are all activities directly associated with 
the product or service, i.e., inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and 
sales, and service, while support activities include the company’s infrastructure, technology, 
human resources and procurement. Porter contends that each activity’s contribution to the 
firm’s success as well as its linkages with other activities need to be thoroughly understood in 
order to optimise the firm’s value chain.  
Porter’s “five forces model” highlights the competitive structure of an industry as shaped by 
the ability of new competitors to enter the market, the threat of substitute products, the 
relative bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, and the degree of rivalry among existing 
competitors (Miller, 1998). Given this structure, the goal of an individual firm is to develop 
strategies (cost-focused or differentiation-focused) that position it in a way to maximise its 
competitive advantage, aligning its value chain activities with these strategies. Moving beyond 
the individual firm, Porter (1985, p. 34) conceptualises value systems, which represent 
sequences of a firm’s value chains from raw material to final consumer, which are aligned to 
deliver value to the end consumers. 
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In the international development literature (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016, p. 7; Gereffi, 
Humphrey, Kaplinsky, & Sturgeon, 2001, p. 3; Kaplinsky, 2000, p. 121; 2004, p. 80; Kaplinsky 
& Morris, 2001, p. 4), value chains have a similar definition to the value system used by Porter. 
A commonly used definition from Kaplinsky and Morris (2000, p. 121) defines the value chain 
as “the full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from conception, 
through the different phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation 
and the input of various producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after 
use”. Value chain analysis (VCA) used by development practitioners expands upon Porter by 
establishing a diagnostic tool for studying the interactions of chain actors among others in 
developing country markets (Rich, Ross, Baker, & Negassa, 2011; Trienekens, 2011) where 
systemic competitiveness induced by globalisation is becoming an important aspect to be 
considered (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). Issues of adding value to value chains are combined 
with an identification of key chain actors (mapping), the assessment of institutional 
arrangements in the chain (governance), addressing the means of value addition (chain 
upgrading), and assessing the benefits of chain participation (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000). 
These four components are also discussed in the six dimension framework for global value 
chain (GVC) analysis introduced by Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016).  
One of the crucial determinants of competitiveness and VC performance is the concept of 
governance (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). Governance refers to institutional arrangements, or 
coordination mechanisms used by trading parties (producers and buyers) (Gereffi, Humphrey, 
& Sturgeon, 2005; Williamson, 1979) in their transactions (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000).  
There is a range of theoretical literature discussing governance mechanisms which contribute 
to VCA. The foundation can be traced back to the new institutional economics literature, with 
Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985, 1991) as the most influential author, whereas the analysis of 
global value chains introduced by Gereffi et al. (1994) is situated more in the political economy 
space and puts more emphasis on the analysis of power relations in the chains, which they 
see reflected in governance structures (Gereffi et al., 2005; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001).  
Governance forms vary across a spectrum, ranging from simple, market-based forms of 
transactions that are based on price and availability (“sharp in by clear agreement, sharp out 
by clear performance” (Macneil, 1974, p. 738)), to hierarchies in which activities are 
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established in one firm, and non-negotiable orders are the main coordination mechanism 
(Williamson, 1979). Hybrid forms are characterised by a mix of coordination mechanisms, 
including price and specification negotiations, with both parties involved in decision making. 
Global value chain analysis basically takes up the notion of markets, hybrids, and hierarchies 
(vertical integration) and further distinguishes three hybrid forms: modular, relational, and 
captive (Dolan & Humphrey, 2004; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Gereffi et al., 2005). 
According to this research stream, the degree of explicit coordination and power asymmetry 
between buyers and suppliers is low in market-based governance and increases as 
coordination needs increase.  
Related to the power relationships between smallholders and other actors in value chains, 
Lee, Gereffi, and Beauvais (2012) developed four trajectories of value chain governance: 
buyer-driven chains, producer-driven chains, bilateral oligopolies, and traditional markets. 
Buyer-driven chains refer to relationships in which (private) quality and safety standards are 
imposed by retailers. This is usually to be found in the large-scale export chains of the large 
supermarket chains which use contracts with plantations or large-scale farmers, but also 
smallholder-based production. Producer-driven chains, at the other extreme, have middle 
actors acting as processors processing products and coordinating the products from producers 
to consumers, and these processors are responsible for quality and safety issues. This type of 
chain is commonly found in the transactions of niche products such as high-value bean crops 
(e.g., coffee, cocoa) and processed foods (e.g., processed tomatoes). In comparison with 
buyer-driven chains, farmers in the producer-driven chains gain less revenue as they face high 
levels of competition. They need to compete with other high-value branded products. Bilateral 
oligopolies are the chains participated in by concentrated producers and retailers in tight 
relationships coordinated to produce differentiated products for a premium (e.g., fair trade 
products). Lee et al. (2012) asserted that chains of this type create higher entry barriers for 
smallholders as they are tightly controlled by intermediaries such as exporters and traders. 
Farmers in bilateral oligopolies are tightly contracted and controlled by lead firms to enhance 
the required safety, quality, social and environmental standards. Contracted farmers are 
heavily reliant on the substantial investment and market assistance offered by leader firms.  
Upgrading opportunities are identified as ways to improve the value chain and enhance 
greater participation in globalised markets (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). According to Kaplinsky 
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and Morris (2001, p. 37), upgrading is based on “the capacity to innovate, and to ensure 
continuous improvement in product and process development”. Four main types of upgrading 
in the VC: process upgrading, product upgrading, functional upgrading and chain upgrading 
are distinguished (Trienekens, 2011). Process upgrading is defined as the activities used to 
increase the efficiency of internal processes (in individual links and the chain as a whole) to 
make them considerably better than those of competitors (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001) through 
the application of superior technologies (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Humphrey & 
Schmitz, 2000). An example of this type of upgrading is the reduction of excess inventory or 
use of faster delivery methods along the value chain (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). Product 
upgrading refers to chain actors or overall chains developing new, value-added products to 
generate higher profits (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). 
Functional upgrading means that actors within a chain, e.g., smallholders, engage in further 
value adding activities, e.g., processing, to achieve higher profits (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). 
The fourth type of upgrading, chain upgrading, describes the shift to a new sector, where prior 
skills can be used but higher value is achieved by participating in a new chain altogether 
(Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001).  
In addition to mapping the actors, characterising the governance structure, and identifying 
chain upgrading possibilities for higher competitive advantage, it is extremely important for 
VCA researchers to understand the income distribution dynamics in VCs to obtain insight into 
the returns shared among chain actors (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). The result of this stage is a 
calculation of total profit throughout the chain and disaggregating the share of this profit to 
different actors of the VC. However, such information does not fully capture or quantify the 
dynamics of the way VCs evolve and change based on new upgrading strategies, investments, 
or public policies, and limits the ability of VCA to prioritise among different options (Rich et al. 
2011). It also does not explicitly measure transaction costs incurred in the exchange of goods 
and services throughout the value chains, thereby neglecting an important determinant of 
competitiveness, and not making full use of the potential of their analysis of governance 
structures. In the following, these gaps in the literature are briefly summarised, before the 
theoretical foundations of transaction cost analysis and the policy analysis matrix (PAM) are 
explained. 
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2.2.2 Knowledge gaps in the VCA literature  
While VCA has a range of advantages for researchers, a number of gaps remain in measuring 
the competitiveness of smallholders in developing countries. Three particular gaps are 
highlighted. First, VCA is very much a descriptive tool, which lacks the ability to quantify the 
benefits of participating in a value chain (Rich et al. 2011). Second, and related to the first gap 
is the inability of VCA to quantify the trade-offs and impacts associated with different policy 
options (Rich et al. 2011). Finally, and especially relevant for this study, while VCA addresses 
the role of transaction costs in the analysis of governance, these costs are also not quantified, 
making it difficult to determine how large or small an influence they have on stakeholder 
competitiveness. However, transaction costs could potentially play an important role as a 
constraint on competitiveness in value chains. Therefore, the use of a VCA approach alone is 
unable to capture detailed pictures of the competitiveness of smallholders in developing 
countries. In order to address these gaps, it is important to consider (1) enhancing our 
understanding of the role that transaction costs could play for value chain competitiveness, 
and (2) mechanisms that could improve our ability to quantify phenomena in the value chain, 
including transaction costs. In the next sections, more theoretical background on transaction 
costs and the potential for a policy tool called the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) will be 
discussed as a way of quantifying competitive advantage and transaction costs within the 
Cambodian vegetable value chain. 
2.3 Transaction costs and value chain competitiveness 
2.3.1 Theoretical framework of transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics was originally introduced by Coase (1937, p. 396), who defined 
transaction costs as “the cost of using the price mechanism or the full costs of carrying out 
exchange and include marketing costs”. Kenneth Arrow (1969, p. 48) defined transaction costs 
more simply, stating that transaction costs are the “costs of running the economic system”. 
Acknowledging the presence of transaction costs represents a departure from the neoclassical 
microeconomic theory assumption that economic exchange is costless, as actors are assumed 
to be fully informed and perfectly rational (homo economics). Transaction cost economics 
instead postulates that actors are boundedly rational (Simon, 1958), i.e., have limited access 
to information as well as limited information processing capacity, and behave 
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opportunistically, i.e. are not only self-interest seeking, but also use guile to pursue their 
objectives. Parties to an exchange are then required to organise their transactions so that 
associated transaction costs are minimised. The organisation of a transaction refers to the 
institutional framework, or governance structure, in which a transaction takes place. Before 
different governance structures are introduced, the types of transaction costs are explained 
in the next section. 
2.3.2 Types of transaction costs 
Williamson (1985, p. 20 et seq.) distinguished between ex ante and ex post transaction costs, 
where the signing of the contract marks the dividing line. Ex ante transaction costs include the 
costs of “drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement”, which occur prior to the 
signature. Further costs related to this might be the costs of searching for information or 
potential exchange partners. Ex post transaction costs, on the other hand, include monitoring 
costs, but also “maladaptation costs” (when agreements are not properly fulfilled), “haggling 
costs” incurred in the efforts to realign partner activities with the initial agreement, and “set 
up and running costs associated with the governance structures […] to which disputes are 
referred” (Williamson 1985, p. 21). Williamson further stresses the problem of these 
transaction cost types being interlinked.  
In the literature, other classifications have evolved, which use a variety of alternative 
categories of transaction costs. Hobbs (1997) remained closest to Williamson’s original 
categories and divides transaction costs into three main categories: information costs, 
negotiation costs, and monitoring costs. A number of further researchers have adopted this 
categorisation in their studies (Gong et al., 2007; Royer, 2011; Vakis et al., 2003). Information 
costs refer to the costs incurred ex ante in business-to-business transactions, and these costs 
also include the costs of searching for price and product information as well as identifying 
potential buyers or sellers. Access to market information is of particular importance in 
developing countries as a result of a high level of price uncertainty and increased product 
specifications (Hobbs, 1997; Vakis et al., 2003). Farmers in developing countries often lack 
information about the price of products and the required quality standards. This type of 
information is particularly important for perishable high-value products such as fish, 
vegetables and grains (Pigali, Khwaja, & Meijer, 2005). Producers in developing countries 
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especially require information associated with the number of buyers and market demand, due 
to the fact that the limited number of buyers increases the market power that buyers have in 
such markets (Vakis et al., 2003). It is also notable that information is costly for farmers in 
developing countries (Vakis et al., 2003), while in developed countries where the information 
systems are greatly developed, information cost is lower (Hobbs, 1997). 
Negotiation costs refer to costs occurring during business transactions and encompass 
commission costs, opportunity costs of trading partners for any physical negotiation regarding 
terms of exchange, and the costs of drafting contracts (Hobbs, 1997). In some countries, 
informal fees (bribes) might need to be considered as well. Several authors also consider 
transportation as an important variable to measure negotiation costs (Azam et al., 2012; 
Hobbs, 1997; Key et al., 2000; Royer, 2011; Vakis et al., 2003). It is argued that transportation 
costs tend to be high for producers in rural areas due to long distances from markets and poor 
road conditions, and this cost is influenced by trade frequency (Hobbs, 1997; Vakis et al., 
2003). Furthermore, communication costs and opportunity costs of time spent by both parties 
are also included as a part of negotiation costs (Azam et al., 2012).  
Monitoring costs or enforcement costs that arise ex post in business exchange concern the 
costs of ensuring the quality standards, payment agreement, and so forth (Hobbs, 1997). 
These types of costs can be essential to prevent trading partners from opportunistic behaviour 
after the agreement. For example, buyers (traders, retailers, or wholesalers) are concerned 
with the quality of products transported from and delivered by producers (farmers), whereas 
farmers might face costs to monitor and enforce payment. This means that if there is any 
damage to products caused by long distance transport, poor road conditions, or poor quality 
maintenance, buyers might request discounts from farmers. If the responsibility for the failure 
is not clearly attributable to either party, this can lead to opportunistic behaviour (Hobbs, 
1997; Royer, 2011). The longer the distance from the farms to markets, the greater the 
enforcement costs faced by farmers, particularly if transport time adversely affects quality 
(Azam et al., 2012; Gong et al., 2007; Hobbs, 1997; Royer, 2011; Vakis et al., 2003). 
Other researchers separate transaction costs into two different types: tangible and intangible 
(Birthal, Joshi, & Gulati, 2005; Cuevas & Graham, 1986). Tangible costs refer to transportation 
costs, communication costs, legal costs, and so forth, while intangible costs relate to the costs 
17 
 
which are influenced by uncertainty and moral hazard occurring “when one party is subjected 
to the hazard that the other party will engage in activities that are undesirable from their 
perspective, such as shirking, cost cutting or debasing quality.” (Gow & Swinnen, 1998, p. 334).  
This classification implies that tangible transaction costs can be calculated through the actual 
expenses in the business transactions, i.e., petrol and meal costs for any travel; phone cards 
used for negotiation or any communication involved in trade transactions with partners; or 
fees used to employ experts or lawyers for contract enforcement or problem solving. These 
costs can be easily recorded using invoices or other recording methods. Unlike tangible 
transaction costs, intangible transaction costs are generally difficult to measure. For example, 
these could include the time spent by each partner on searching for or screening the most 
appropriate buyers or sellers; negotiating for better prices to increase profit possibly gained 
from partners; and monitoring or enforcing partners to ensure that they are reliable. As there 
is no expenditure recorded for accounting systems, intangible transaction costs seem to be 
calculated through the estimation of opportunity costs.  
Another category of literature also divides transaction costs into two types, but with a 
different rationale. The first type is called fixed transaction costs, and the second is variable 
(proportional) transaction costs (Azam et al., 2012; Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; Renkow et 
al., 2004; Vakis et al., 2003). Fixed transaction costs are the costs required in: (a) searching for 
a buyer (or market) who can provide the best price, (b) negotiating and bargaining for a better 
price from buyers and (c) screening (enforcement, bribery and supervision) buyers who wish 
to buy products on credit to make sure that they are reliable. Fixed transaction costs are 
invariant to the quantity of the products sold or bought by trade partners (Key et al., 2000). 
For instance, farmers may have invariant costs related to the search for partners to buy a 
tonne or two tonnes of vegetables. Variable transaction costs, on the other hand, are 
proportional to good quantity. Two key determinants of variable transaction costs are 
distance between exchange partners and transportation costs (Azam et al., 2012; Key et al., 
2000).  
These three typologies overlap in their use of variables. Because of this, this thesis integrates 
those main variables encompassing travel cost, communication cost and commission cost and 
puts them in the framework of Hobbs (1997). In this research, the transaction costs arising in 
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the tomato value chain can be quantified in three steps: ex-ante, during the transaction and 
ex-post.   
2.3.3 Drivers of transaction costs 
According to Williamson, transaction costs are influenced by three important drivers - the 
uncertainty surrounding a particular transaction, the level of asset specificity, and the 
frequency of transactions.  
Uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding a transaction 
(Grover & Malhotra, 2003). A further distinction is made between environmental and 
behavioural uncertainty. The former includes unpredictable circumstances regarding, among 
others, the environment, technology, demand volume, or varieties (Grover & Malhotra, 2003), 
behavioural uncertainty and information asymmetry (Royer, 2011) as well as price uncertainty 
(Royer, 2011; Wever, Wognum, Trienekens, & Omta, 2012). Behavioural uncertainty, on the 
other hand, refers to agency problems and particularly moral hazard caused by information 
asymmetry and the consequential risk of opportunistic behaviour. Moral hazard problems 
occur after a contract has been signed, when trade parties attempt to take advantage of their 
partners (Gow & Swinnen, 1998) by not fulfilling the agreed tasks in the agreed quality. The 
transaction parties are then required to safeguard specific assets (see below), monitor partner 
behaviour, and eventually enforce the contract – with each of these actions causing 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985).  
Williamson (1991, p. 281) defined asset specificity as “the degree to which a relationship-
specific asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrificing 
the productive value”. Williamson defined six types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity 
which refers to locations that have positive effects on cost minimization in relation to 
inventory and transport; (2) physical asset specificity i.e., the specialised tools used in 
production; (3) human asset specificity, referring to skilled labourers who have been trained 
for specialised tasks in production (i.e. on-the-job training); (4) brand name capital; (5) 
dedicated assets, defined as the discrete investment to be flexible at customers’ behest; and 
(6) temporary specificity which is akin to technological non-separability or a type of specific 
site which can be temporarily used to complete specific agreements between both exchange 
parties. Asset specificity can have important effects on investment relationships such as when 
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the requirement of asset specificity increases in the investment, it increases the need for 
negotiation between trading partners. This can lead to hold-up problems (Gow & Swinnen, 
1998; Wever et al., 2012) caused by partner self-interest seeking ex-post adjustments to the 
contract, especially in terms of price. Thus, safeguarding specific assets incurs transaction 
costs.  
Finally, the frequency of transactions in trade relationships between buyers and sellers is one 
of the key elements used to categorise the governance structure in the work of Williamson 
(1979). There are three types of transaction frequency: one transaction, occasional 
transactions, and recurrent transactions. The focus of transaction cost theory is on occasional 
and recurrent types (Williamson (1979). Williamson (1985) further postulates that in a 
comparative static analysis, a given transaction will cause different levels of transaction costs 
dependent on the chosen governance structure, and that, everything else being equal, the 
governance structure that minimizes transaction costs should be chosen.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between uncertainty and specificity on the one hand, 
and transaction costs as they are moderated by the chosen governance mechanism, on the 
other. When there is a low degree of required specific investment and a low level of 
uncertainty, market-based governance ceteris paribus incurs the lowest level of transaction 
costs, while with a high degree of specific investment, the hierarchical form would be 
relatively favourable with respect to transaction costs incurred. In a medium range of both 
uncertainty and asset specificity, hybrid structures of various kinds would be the transaction 
cost minimising governance form (Williamson, 1991).  
Market-based structures are generally suitable in the case of commodities. Branded products, 
at the other extreme, which rely on specific inputs to deliver on their value proposition, will 
require the brand owner to closely coordinate or even integrate any activities which face high 
levels of uncertainty. The hierarchy here incurs lower transaction costs because information 
asymmetry is reduced and specific investments in a brand are safeguarded against 
opportunistic behaviour (Gow & Swinnen, 1998).  
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Figure 2.1:  Relationship between uncertainty, asset specificity, governance structures, 
and transaction costs (Williamson, 1991: 284) 
2.3.4 Methodologies and key findings of previous research in transaction costs 
measurement in developed and developing countries 
A number of studies have attempted to measure the impact of transaction costs on 
agricultural markets. However, there is no standard methodology used to measure 
transaction costs (Royer, 2011). This section will review several of the measures that have 
attempted to measure transaction costs in the agri-food trade. Roughly, approaches can be 
classified into qualitative descriptions and quantitative measurements. 
Hobbs (1997) conceptualised a method to measure transaction costs incurred in slaughter 
cattle marketing to identify the factors affecting the choice between liveweight (auction) and 
deadweight (direct) sales. After classifying transaction costs into three types as shown in the 
above section (information, negotiation and monitoring costs), she used a Tobit limited 
dependent variable analysis to estimate the relative importance of those transaction costs. It 
was the first attempt to collect information about transaction costs in a questionnaire to 
obtain data on a range of variables.  
To measure information costs, Hobbs (1997) collected four main variables: price uncertainty, 
auction price information costs (measured separately for both marketing channels), direct sale 
price information costs and product information costs. Negotiation costs are measured for 
both marketing channels separately, and include transportation costs, transportation efforts, 
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commission costs, speed of payment, the lack of control over sale orders, risk of non-sale, 
unequal bargaining power, frequency of auction sales, time spent at the auction, adequate 
number of buyers and effectiveness of packing plant buyers. Monitoring costs are measured 
by Hobbs (1997) in terms of shrinkage loss, carcass damage, grade uncertainty, and grade 
information asymmetry. The result of the study showed that the information costs which had 
been expected to be high were statistically insignificant due to the presence of strong 
information sharing systems in the United Kingdom, eliminating price uncertainty. By contrast, 
negotiation costs and monitoring costs are significant transaction costs that need to be taken 
into consideration. Gong et al. (2007) built on the work of Hobbs (1997) to study the effect of 
transaction costs on the decisions of farmers in the beef supply chain in China. The results 
from their regression analysis showed similar results to Hobbs, namely that negotiation costs 
and monitoring costs are significant factors affecting farmer decisions. 
Royer (2011) measured the magnitude of transaction costs faced by milk producers in their 
contractual trading with processors in Canada and the United Kingdom. This author used a 
quantitative approach to quantify transaction costs based on Hobbs’s (1997) categorisation. 
Their study examined two different forms of hybrid governance mechanisms: centralised 
contracting and decentralised bilateral contracting. Royer (2011) collected data for the study 
through two methods: interview and survey. The result showed that in the contractual trade, 
negotiation costs are the lowest transaction costs, and enforcement costs are the highest, 
whereas there are lower transaction costs in the trade reliant on the marketing board setting. 
However, the transaction costs arising in both coordination methods are not significant 
meaning that they have less effect on the competitiveness of the dairy industry. This study 
indicates the importance of a high level of institutional arrangements in minimizing 
transaction costs.    
Key et al. (2000) elaborated on a model developed by Goetz (1992) to explore the effect of 
transaction costs on farmer decisions in participation in the corn market in Mexico. They used 
a structural model to econometrically identify the separate role of two types of variables: fixed 
and proportional transaction costs. These authors concluded that both types of variables are 
statistically significant in the estimation of household participation in the market, with 
proportional costs (transport costs and distance) having more effects on sellers (farmers) than 
buyers. Their results confirmed that because of high transaction costs, farmers receive lower 
22 
 
profit compared to buyers, putting barriers for smallholders to participate in formal markets. 
Given that low bargaining power gives farmers low incentives to compete in the market, poor 
farmers remain stuck in their self-sufficient production.  
Renkow et al. (2004) conceptualised a framework to quantify fixed transaction costs faced by 
maize producing households in Kenya. Using the categorisation proposed by Key et al. (2000) 
and (Goetz, 1992), and employing a Probit analysis, they found that fixed transaction costs 
significantly influence the market participation of smallholders, as farmers participate in the 
market only if the gains from trade exceed fixed transaction costs. Two main factors creating 
high fixed transaction cost in this case are the distance from farm to markets and their 
underdeveloped transportation means.  
Azam et al. (2012) examined the effects of transaction costs on the market participation of 
Cambodian rice farmers. These authors also adopted the model introduced by Key et al. (2000) 
to quantify fixed and proportional transaction costs. It is similar to the aforementioned studies 
in that the authors highlighted that transaction costs are challenging barriers for smallholders 
to enter formal markets. The benefits from rice production are mostly obtained by large 
producers and traders who already have bargaining power in the market. The study also 
indicates that small-scale farmers face both high fixed and variable (proportional) transaction 
costs induced by the distance from the market and poor rural infrastructure (road conditions 
and other physical facilities). 
Vakis et al. (2003) mixed Key et al. (2000) and Hobbs (1997) framework to measure the impact 
of transaction costs on the market choices of Peruvian potato farmers. The authors put the 
two types of transaction costs (proportional and fixed) classified by Key et al. (2000) into three 
different stages of transactions (ex ante, during the transaction and ex post) adopted from 
Hobbs (1997). The collected data are analysed in two steps. A reduced form conditional Logit 
market choice model is used in the first step, whereas a semi-structural conditional Logit 
market choice model is used for the analysis in the second step. The result of this study 
indicates the significant influence of transaction costs, especially price information and 
bargaining costs, on market selection made by Peruvian farmers. Vakis et al. (2003) also found 
that transaction costs are affected by distances of production to market. Farmers in isolated 
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regions face high costs, and one of the biggest causes for concern is transportation costs when 
the flow of information does not work well.      
Sartorius and Kirsten (2007) attempted to test the influence of trust on government structure 
(named contract characteristics in their study) by adopting a transaction costs framework in a 
case study of the Southern African sugarcane and timber industries. They used Williamson’s 
framework and looked at frequency, asset specificity and uncertainty in different types of 
contracts: classical contract (informal contract), neo classical contract for specification, neo 
classical contract for strategic alliance, bilateral relational for formal operation, and unified 
relational for full vertical integration. This study confirms that the transaction costs are 
reduced by a high level of trust, and a higher level of trust is built by moving to higher forms 
of governance structure.  
From this review, despite its limitation in the number of studies, it is interesting to note that 
it indicates a difference in the degree of transaction costs in developed countries and Third 
World countries. In particular, the studies conducted in developed countries confirm relatively 
low transaction costs, especially information costs (Hobbs, 1997; Royer, 2011), whereas high 
transaction costs are faced by smallholders in developing countries (Azam et al., 2012; Gong 
et al., 2007; Key et al., 2000; Renkow et al., 2004; Vakis et al., 2003).  
Table 2.4:  Summary of the methods and key findings of previous research on transaction 
costs measurement 
Authors and 
years 
Methods Key findings 
Hobbs (1997) -Three types of transaction costs: 
information (ex-ante), negotiation 
costs (costs of carrying out 
transactions) and monitoring costs 
(ex-post) 
-Using Tobit limited dependent 
variable analysis 
-Survey 
- Information costs: insignificant 
- Negotiation costs: significant 
- Monitoring costs : significant  
Key et al. 
(2000) 
-Two types of transaction costs: fixed 
and variable 
-Structural model to estimate supply 
response 
-Survey 
- Fixed transaction costs: 
significant  
- Variable transaction costs: 
significant 
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Vakis et al. 
(2003) 
-Mixed Hobbs’ (1997) and Key et al.’s 
(2000) typologies 
-Market choice model and equation 
-Survey 
- Information costs: significant ++ 
- Bargaining costs   : significant ++ 
- Monitoring costs  : significant + 
Renkow et al. 
(2004) 
-Used Key et al. (2000) typology 
-Household demand and supply 
model 
-Survey 
-Fixed transaction costs: 
significant 
-Variable transaction costs: NA 
Sartorius and 
Kirsten (2007) 
-Used Williamson’s framework 
without each typology to test 
whether trust significantly 
influences supply characteristics 
-Case study approach (qualitative) 
-Yes, trust has significant 
influence on supply 
characteristics, but it may be No if 
other factors are considered in 
the context of developing 
countries. 
Azam et al. 
(2012) 
-Used Key et al. (2000) typology 
-Heckman type regression model 
-Survey 
-Fixed transaction costs: 
significant  
-Variable transaction costs: 
significant  
 
2.4 The policy analysis matrix  
The policy analysis matrix (PAM) was pioneered by Monke and Pearson (1989). A PAM is a 
computational framework that (a) provides information and analysis to policy makers to 
measure the competitiveness of agricultural systems at current market prices; (b) estimates 
social profitability that reflects the opportunity costs of products or inputs used; and (c) 
measures the effects of policies in creating gaps between the status quo and a more socially 
optimal situation (Pearson et al., 2003). In this section, the PAM and its use will be explained 
in general, with a discussion on its usefulness in measuring transaction costs in the next 
section, following the work of Kydd et al (1997).  
The structure of the PAM is illustrated in table 2.5. The first row of the PAM measures 
profitability (D) for a particular system at private prices (measured at the market prices found 
in the domestic market) based on revenue (A) minus the costs of tradeable inputs (those 
traded on world markets such as imported fertilisers) (B) and costs of non-tradeable factors 
such as labour or services sourced in the domestic market (C). The data in this row include 
government interventions (both direct and indirect) such as taxes, input subsidies, and so on 
(Winter-Nelson & Aggrey-Fynn, 2008). The second row measures profitability but at social 
prices, defined as comparable world prices for tradeable outputs or inputs (Pearson et al., 
Table 2.4 Continued 
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2003). Social profit (H) is the result of calculation of social revenue (E) minus the total cost 
(tradeable inputs (F) and non-tradeable factors (G)).  
The values of E, F and, G in the second row can be different from those of A, B, and C (in the 
first row), depending on policy interventions. The third row in the PAM quantifies the 
divergence between private and social budgets. All the columns in the third row are the result 
of the subtraction between those in the first row and those in the second row. The result is 
that the divergence of revenue (I) in the first column is equal to the private revenue minus 
social revenue (I=A-E); the divergence of tradeable input costs is J=B-F; divergences in non-
tradeable costs are K=C-G; and the divergence in profits is L=D-H. If there are no interventions 
from government in relation to price policies, monetary policy, as well as macroeconomic 
policies, the value of the divergences will tend to be close to zero. However, if there are 
imperfections in the market, such as market failures or transaction costs, these divergences 
would be non-zero.  
Table 2.5: Policy analysis matrix 
 Revenues 
Costs 
Profit Tradeable 
Inputs 
Non-tradeable 
Factors 
Private  A B C D 
Social E F G H 
Effects of 
divergences 
I J K L 
Source: Monke and Pearson (1989) 
The PAM can be used to compute several indicators that quantify the severity of policy 
distortions and compute indicators of comparative advantage. These include the nominal 
protection coefficient (NPC), real protection coefficient (RPC), effective protection coefficient 
(EPC), domestic resource costs (DRCs) and net private profitability (NPP). NPC is the ratio of 
the farm-gate price (private price) and border price (social price) (NPC=A/E). The ratio shows 
the gap between private prices and social prices. NPC is separated into two types: NPC for 
tradeable outputs (NPCo) and NPC for tradeable inputs (NPCi), where the latter is the ratio of 
B to F. For outputs, if the value of NPC is less than one (NPC<1), the interpretation is that the 
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production system is taxed by policies, while it is subsidized if NPC is over one (NPC>1); the 
opposite interpretation holds for the NPC for inputs. 
The RPC adjusts the NPC by the ratio of the market exchange rate (e) and the equilibrium 
exchange rate (e*), where RPC= (e/e*) (NPC). This ratio measures the additional influences of 
the exchange rate on product prices.  
The EPC is the ratio of private revenues minus tradeable inputs and social revenues minus 
socially tradeable inputs [EPC= (A-B)/ (E-F)]. It indicates the joint effects imposed by policies 
on both tradeable outputs and tradeable inputs. The interpretation of the EPC ratio value is 
slightly different from that of the NPC (Pearson et al., 2003). If the EPC value is over 1 (EPC>1), 
it implies that policy interventions provide incentives for farmers to produce. It might be the 
result of the implementation of price policies inducing private output prices that are higher 
than social output prices or the implementation of input subsidy policies to reduce private 
tradeable input costs. By contrast, if the EPC value is less than 1 (EPC<1), farmers are taxed by 
policy interventions.  
NPP is the ratio of the private revenue minus total private cost [NPP= A/ (B+C)]. The purpose 
of this computation is to compare revenue against costs. If the result of the ratio is higher than 
one (NPP>1), it indicates that there is a financial profitability leading to high incentives for 
farmers to compete in the market (Adesina & Coulibaly, 1998).  
DRC is the ratio of social domestic factors (non-tradeable factors) and social revenues minus 
tradeable inputs [DRC=G/(E-F)]. This calculation measures the comparative advantage of the 
production system, by addressing whether it is beneficial to promote local production or to 
import from other countries. If the DRC is less than one, the local production system has 
comparative advantage meaning that a country saves foreign exchange by producing locally.  
A number of researchers have utilised this framework to analyse a range of factors influencing 
the role of government policies on agricultural production. Nelson and Panggabean (1991) 
used a PAM to analyse the costs of Indonesian sugar policy. Their results showed that both 
dry land and irrigated sugar cane cultivation are socially unprofitable, caused by the high 
opportunity cost of land. This leads to higher input costs compared to cane revenue. However, 
as the government of Indonesia has instituted price policies that cause the Indonesian 
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sugarcane price to be higher than the global sugarcane price and input subsidies that result in 
lower tradeable input costs for sugarcane production, incentives to diversify from other crops 
to sugarcane are still not an option for Indonesian farmers in Java as the price of sugarcane is 
lower than that of other crops.  
Yao (1997) used this framework to quantify the competitiveness of rice production and other 
crops in Thailand. PAM results showed that rice has a comparative advantage over soybean 
and mungbean production as the value of DRC for rice is smaller than that of soybeans and 
mungbeans. This result is induced by the low non-tradeable factor costs such as the potential 
of land used in favour of rice, low water costs, and low labour costs found in rice production. 
However, Yao (1997) highlighted that if the rice price remains in a downward trend in the 
global market, diversification might lead to more comparative advantage compared to other 
production systems.  
Adesina and Coulibaly (1998) adopted a PAM for the study of the policy and competitiveness 
of agro-forestry based technologies for maize production in Cameroon. PAM results indicated 
that maize production under agro-forestry-based systems has a high comparative advantage 
due to the low costs of both tradeable and non-tradeable inputs. The application of agro-
forestry results in high soil fertility through the dominant use of local resources rather than 
chemicals bought from the market. This implies that agro-forestry techniques are effective to 
reduce production costs via the utilization of available local resources instead of tradeable 
inputs. This explains why the DRC value is less than one indicating that adoption of an agro-
forestry system for maize production in Cameroon has a comparative advantage.  
Fang and Beghin (2000) used a PAM in their study of food self-sufficiency, comparative 
advantage and agricultural trade in China. Their study showed that labour-intensive crops such 
as fruits and vegetables have a higher comparative advantage over land-intensive crops 
(several types of rice). The reason behind this result is that China is a populous country with 
limited availability of arable land, so labour intensive production systems such as vegetables, 
tobacco, cotton, and fruits have a comparative advantage over more land-intensive crop 
systems; i.e., rice and maize.  
Mohanty, Fang, and Chaudhary (2002) applied a PAM in their assessment of the 
competitiveness of Indian cotton production. The PAM analysis indicated that the Indian 
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cotton production system has a lower comparative advantage in comparison with sugarcane 
and groundnuts. Without the interventions from the government, cotton producers would 
not be able to generate profit.  
Most recently, Winter-Nelson and Aggrey-Fynn (2008) used a PAM to identify opportunities 
in the agricultural sector in Ghana. The result of the study showed that both the maize and 
the rice systems are profitable and contribute to the growth of Ghanaian farmer incomes. 
Maize production systems have higher levels of profit in comparison with rice production as 
rice production systems require more inputs such as fertilisers, resulting in higher input costs. 
Another reason which reduces profits in rice production compared to maize is the downward 
trend of the global price of rice. With this result, Winter-Nelson and Aggrey-Fynn (2008) 
encouraged the continuity of the intervention from price policies on rice production even 
though rice production has lower comparative advantage compared to maize, because rice is 
one of the dominant products employing a majority of Ghanaian farmers. 
This part of the literature review shows that PAM has been widely used, mostly in developing 
countries, to evaluate a range of factors in a number of agricultural crops.  However, none of 
PAM literature has put this framework into practice relevant to the value chain associated 
issues, especially transaction costs. This research has identified an essential role of PAM to fill 
this gap, and the initiation of this usage is discussed in the following sections.  
Table 2.6: Summary of previous research using PAM 
Authors and 
years 
Main purpose Key findings 
Nelson and 
Panggabean 
(1991) 
-Analyse the costs of Indonesian 
sugar policy 
-Both dryland and irrigated sugar cane 
are socially unprofitable (DRC >1).  
Yao (1997) -Quantify the competitiveness of 
rice production and other crops 
in Thailand 
-DRC of rice < DRC of soybeans and 
mungbeans suggesting farmers stay 
focused on rice production. 
Adesina and 
Coulibaly 
(1998) 
-Study of the competitiveness of 
agro-forestry based technologies 
for maize production in 
Cameroon 
-DRC <1 suggesting that agro-forestry 
based technologies for maize 
production that have comparative 
advantage be encouraged to carry on. 
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Fang and 
Beghin 
(2000) 
-Study food self-sufficiency, 
competitive advantage and 
agricultural trade in China 
-DRC of labour-intensive crops < DRC of 
land-intensive crops suggesting a 
considerable focus on labour-intensive 
crops. 
Mohanty et 
al. (2002) 
-Assess the competitiveness of 
Indian cotton production 
-DRC of cotton production > DRC of 
sugarcane and groundnuts suggesting 
the diversification. 
Winter-
Nelson and 
Aggrey-Fynn 
(2008) 
- Identify opportunities in the 
agricultural sector in Ghana 
-DRC of rice >DRC of maize, but there is 
encouragement by the author to stay 
focused on rice production as it plays a 
significant role in employing the vast 
majority of Ghanaians. In this case, 
policy intervention is crucial. 
Table 2.6 Continued  
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
As indicated in chapter 2, this study employs two different but complementary frameworks to 
gain insights into Cambodian farmers’ competitiveness in tomato production. First, a standard 
VCA is adopted that pays special attention to the identification and measurement of 
transaction costs. Second, based on the results from the VCA, a modified PAM is developed 
that takes into account transaction costs and governance forms. 
3.1 The application of the VCA in this study of competitiveness and 
transaction costs 
The VCA framework conceptualised by Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) is adapted to capture 
aspects of the tomato value chain. Specific attention is paid to mapping the value chain and 
analysing the governance structures to assess the types of transaction costs that exist in these 
value chains.  
A stakeholder analysis was conducted at the initial stage of this study. This part of the study 
captured basic information of the value chain encompassing the number of actors involved in 
the tomato trade; their location and distances from one actor to others; the infrastructure 
situation indicating the condition of the road quality which is a possible cause of high 
transaction costs; means of transportation or product flows; generic activities of the different 
actors involved in the tomato value chain; gross output values; net output values; physical 
flows; and information flow showing the communication pattern in the chain (Kaplinsky & 
Morris, 2001). Adapting the VCA to address the listed information allows the researcher to 
obtain insight into the potential physical and institutional constraints faced by actors in the 
tomato value chain. To achieve this, a participatory value chain mapping is essential (Rich et 
al., 2011).  
The second stage of a VCA approach is to analyse the current (and potential) governance 
structures in different linkages across the value chain. Drawing on the work of Williamson 
(1979), four important dimensions were used to identify the current governance structure: 
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contractual patterns, transaction frequency, uncertainty, and level of asset specificity in 
tomato production investment. Based on these criteria, characteristics, and dimensions of the 
three main types of governance mechanisms (market-based, hybrid and hierarchy) are 
identified. In some cases, it is possible that governance mechanisms are not in place in 
selected tomato value chains. In others, there are different variants of hybrid models in 
particular. To develop suitable typologies of governance models and their characteristics in 
terms of the transaction costs faced and incurred in each, the information is drawn from key 
informants.   
This study expands the use of VCA by measuring transaction costs in the governance 
identification component. The three types of transaction costs classified by Hobbs (1997) are 
adopted as this framework is suitable for capturing all variables considered by other 
transaction costs typologies. In the particular governance structure identified based on 
Williamson, the transaction costs to be quantified are those incurred ex ante and ex post the 
transaction decision. The main variables used in this quantification are travel costs including 
fuel costs and opportunity costs, commission costs and communication costs such as phone 
cards. In this study, these costs are expected to arise in every transaction from ex ante to ex 
post.  
However, on reaching this step, the analysis is not yet sufficient to respond to the research 
objectives. This research has identified another useful approach to improve the quantification 
of transaction costs. The policy analysis matrix (PAM) can play a critical role in making a 
complete analysis of competitiveness from the perspective of transaction costs. 
3.2 The application of PAM on value chains, smallholder competitiveness, 
and transaction costs 
The PAM framework was initially developed to evaluate public policies (Monke & Pearson, 
1989) leading to a wide range of field research in this context (Adesina & Coulibaly, 1998; Fang 
& Beghin, 2000; Mohanty et al., 2002; Nelson & Panggabean, 1991; Winter-Nelson & Aggrey-
Fynn, 2008; Yao, 1997). However, public policy distortions are less important in agriculture 
nowadays. Nonetheless, the PAM still has some use in looking at other distortions.  
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Kydd et al. (1997) proposed the use of this approach to analyse transaction costs. They 
indicated that poor institutions and contractual arrangements are among the issues behind 
the unequal bargaining power faced by farmers in developing countries. Much of the profits 
from agricultural commodities are often received by intermediaries or downstream actors, 
while farmers encounter high costs in their trade relationships. In addition to high input costs 
(fertilisers, chemicals and capital), high transaction costs resulting from informal institutions 
are also a considerable challenge and influence competitiveness in developing countries.   
Building on the work of Kydd et al. (1997), the PAM is adapted to quantify and integrate the 
transaction costs that potentially influence the competitiveness of Cambodian smallholders in 
the tomato value chain. The approach taken here further addresses the role that governance 
relationships play in affecting competitiveness, incorporating characteristics of different 
governance modes directly in the PAM. This contributes to the literature on value chains by 
proposing a new quantitative way of looking at value chain governance. It also adds to the 
literature on PAMs by demonstrating and quantifying how market structures and institutional 
considerations influence competitiveness in addition to policy.   
The PAM is adapted as illustrated in Table 3.1. As in the original PAM, revenues and costs at 
private prices are those that currently prevail in the market. Tradeable inputs in this case 
include fuel, chemical substances (pesticides, herbicides, insecticides, etc.), fertilisers (organic 
fertilisers and inorganic fertilisers) and other equipment (fixed inputs to be depreciated such 
as pumping machines, tillers, and others involved in production). Domestic factors or non-
tradeable inputs represent the costs of internal factors necessarily used in the production such 
as land, labour and capital. However, in this PAM, private budgets include various transaction 
costs. Based on the transaction costs literature reviewed earlier (Hobbs, 1997), farmers face 
a variety of ex-ante costs, costs arising during the transaction, and ex-post costs. Because of 
this, these transaction costs need to be assessed through rigorous field-data collection, and 
these costs are expected to influence both the price received for output as well as the various 
input (tradeable and non-tradeable) costs of production. It is hypothesised that the three 
types of transaction costs (information, negotiation, and monitoring) incur in the transactions 
of buying the abovementioned tradeable inputs for tomato production and in the costs 
involved in accessing credit and employing labour. In addition, there are transaction costs 
associated with the level of physical infrastructure at farm-gates and chain levels that 
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influence the profitability and competitiveness of farmers. Social budgets, by contrast, do not 
include transaction costs and are measured in a traditional PAM at social prices.  
The adapted PAM further distinguishes between different governance modes that could 
prevail. While transaction costs create a gap between productions at private prices versus at 
its social opportunity cost, those divergences might differ depending on the particular type of 
governance, so that different types of governance might reduce the overall divergences in the 
system. For instance, using contracts might significantly reduce certain types of transaction 
costs relative to markets in the provision of inputs or information. It may also raise other types 
of transaction costs (e.g., negotiating costs, compliance costs). Accordingly, the divergence 
between private and social prices thus depend on the prospective governance that could be 
used. This study considers the three main forms of governance from Williamson (1979): spot 
markets, hybrids (contract farming), and vertical integration.  
The adapted PAM is used to measure competitiveness for the different types of governance 
models, including the use of the PRC, EPC and DRCs as suggested by Kydd et al. (1997). As the 
focus of the PAM here is not on policy distortions, there are some differences in the 
interpretation of these results. Two examples of these differences are given below in the 
context of the EPC and DRC. 
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Table 3.1: Policy analysis matrix with transaction costs and governance relationships 
Governance structures Revenues 
Costs 
Profit 
Tradeable 
Inputs 
Non-
tradeable 
Factors 
Private budget 
Private (including TC) A B C D 
Market-based governance A1 B1 C1 D1 
Hybrid governance (e.g., 
contracts) 
A2 B2 C2 D2 
Vertical integration A3 B3 C3 D3 
Social budget 
Social  E F G H 
Market-based governance E1 F1 G1 H1 
Hybrid governance (e.g., 
contracts) 
E2 F2 G2 H2 
Vertical integration E3 F3 G3 H3 
Effects of divergences 
Status quo (including TC) I=A-E J=B-F K=C-G L=D-H 
Market-based governance I1 = A1-E1 J1=B1-F1 K1=C1-G1 L1=D1-H1 
Hybrid governance (e.g., 
contracts) 
I2 = A2-E2 J2=B2-F2 K2=C2-G2 L2=D2-H2 
Vertical integration I3 = A3-E3 J3=B3-F3 K3=C3-G3 L3=D3-H3 
Source: Adapted from (Monke & Pearson, 1989) and Kydd et al. (1997) 
 
The EPC is the ratio of private revenues (A) minus private tradeable input costs (B) and the 
minus of social revenues (E) and social tradeable input costs (F) [EPC=(An-Bn)/(En-Fn)], where 
n is the number indicating type of governance. In this framework, the ratio measures the 
influence of transaction costs occurring in both farm-gate price and private tradeable input 
costs under different governance forms. If there is no policy intervention and if the value of 
EPC is less than one, it can be interpreted that high transaction costs lead to the divergence 
between the private budgets and social budgets causing low efficiency in the tomato 
production system under a specific governance mode. In this situation, alternative governance 
structures might help to reduce transaction costs. If the EPC value is over one, the current 
governance structure is efficient, although it is possible other systems might lead to better 
outcomes. If the EPC value is equal to one, there is no difference between the current 
structure and higher forms of governance in terms of transaction costs. 
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Likewise, the domestic resource costs (DRC) measures the comparative advantage of tomato 
production. In this context, the DRC is the ratio of the non-tradeable input costs divided by 
the subtraction of output price and tradeable input costs [DRCs=Gn/(En-Fn)], and this ratio is 
computed in each governance structure in the social budgets. In different forms of 
governance, there might be differences in the value of the DRC. If the value of the DRC is less 
than one, it indicates that tomato production in Cambodia under a given mode of governance 
has a comparative advantage over the import of vegetables. If DRC is over one, there is no 
comparative advantage in tomato production in Cambodia. In this situation, this suggests that 
certain modes of governance may be more or less efficient than relying on imports.  
3.3 Research design and data collection 
3.3.1 Commodity selection for the study 
Tomatoes were selected for the study based on their importance for the Khmer people and 
their high market value compared to other vegetables grown in Cambodia (Chhean et al., 
2004; Genova, Weinberger, Sokhom, Vanndy, & Yarith, 2006; McNaughton, 2006). It is also 
interesting to select tomatoes for the case study as, even though there is high demand for 
them for daily food consumption and they have a high market value, tomatoes are among 
those vegetables that have significant imports (Chhean et al., 2004; Nuppun, 2016; SNV, 
2014). As the sources of data associated with tomatoes and other vegetables in Cambodia are 
inadequate and outdated, the researcher has also carried out a quick market observation to 
confirm that tomatoes are matched to the criteria above.  
3.3.2 Study areas  
This study focuses on the regions of Cambodia that have a high percentage of small-scale 
tomato growers. However, there is a lack of secondary data showing the volumes produced 
by region. Given the focus of the study on market competitiveness, it is important to consider 
regions based on their distance from the main markets (Phnom Penh capital city) and distance 
from borders with neighbouring countries (Thailand and Vietnam). Based on these criteria, 
two provinces among the twenty-five provinces of Cambodia are selected: Battambang 
province and Kandal province. Battambang borders Thailand, and is 291 km away from Phnom 
Penh (Phnom Penh Capital Hall, 2017). Kandal, on the other hand, is the closest to the largest 
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vegetable market (Phnom Penh) at 11 km (Phnom Penh Capital Hall, 2017), and also close to 
Vietnam (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The map of Cambodia (The United Nations, 2004) 
3.3.3 Data collection methodology  
A mixed method approach combining informant interviews, focus group discussions, case 
study and quantitative analysis through the use of a PAM is applied in this research.   
3.3.3.1 Key informant 
Data collection from key informants was through semi-structured interviews using open-
ended questions. However, the interview was conducted as a conversation in association with 
the topic facilitated by the researcher. The key informant interview is an important method 
used to collect specific information from key people in target areas of the research (Chambers, 
1997). For this study, general information regarding the geography of the study zone, 
production conditions, and target respondents (tomato farmers) is needed. The key informant 
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approach plays a crucial role in capturing social budgets for PAM analysis. The key informants 
selected in this case are the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF); provincial 
departments of agriculture; local authorities (provinces, districts, communes and villages); 
and NGOs. This method is also important in collecting data from actors in the value system 
such as vegetable middlemen, retailers, and wholesalers. The detailed number of respondents 
is shown in Table 3.2.  
3.3.3.2 Focus group discussions  
According to Hennink (2014), focus group discussions help to identify key characteristics of 
specific issues through an active, participatory discussion with a predetermined group of 
people. In comparison with structured interviews whereby questioners take the lead with 
passive interviewees, a focus group discussion allows researchers to collect in-depth 
information from the active participation of participants. Because of this, there is now a wide 
use of this approach across multiple disciplines (Hennink, 2014).    
Focus group discussion is the main data collection method in this research. This approach was 
conducted with specific tomato farmers to collect data required for the VCA and PAM. A 
snowball approach was appropriate to select respondents. With consultation with local 
authorities, the researcher scheduled meetings for collecting data, and farmers indicated by 
key informants were invited to participate in the focus group meeting. The number of focus 
group meetings conducted depended on the confirmation of data sufficiency for an analysis. 
The three group meetings per province based on the location (near, middle distance, and far 
from provincial markets) due to the limitations of time and budget provided sufficient 
information concerning private budgets (farm-gate prices) relevant to value chain 
stakeholders, tradeable input costs, non-tradeable input costs, output prices, and transaction 
costs involved in these aspects. To ensure that the data required for the analysis were 
sufficient and appropriately collected, data collection manuals consisting of question 
checklists, facilitation methods, and data templates were designed in advance (see annexes).  
3.3.3.3 Case study 
Yin (2009, p. 18) defined a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context. This author points out that this approach 
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is generalizable to theoretical propositions; however, it cannot be used for the generalization 
of the populations. The number of cases ranges from a single case to multiple cases. A single 
case is also accepted, but a larger number of cases (multiple case study) represents 
replications that allow for theoretical framework development (Ellram, 1996; Lewis-Beck, 
2004; Yin, 2009).  
In this research, the case study is useful to capture aspects of alternative models of agricultural 
business which have been introduced in Cambodia to deal with smallholder competitive 
issues. The cases were selected as a result of a snowball approach with focus groups and key 
informants. This means that information concerning the cases to be investigated has been 
provided by tomato farmers, NGOs as well other stakeholders. As shown in Table 3.2, three 
cases have been selected: 1) the case study of the use of formal contracts between a sponsor 
and smallholders, 2) the case study of the higher form of institutional arrangement (compared 
to the current conventional practice) between a sponsor and smallholders depending on 
informal contracts, and 3) the case study of another business model named by the project as 
a “partnership approach”.  
3.3.3.4 Selection of respondents 
There are nine categories of respondents identified for this research: representatives from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF), local authority (commune chiefs), NGO 
officers or other stakeholders working in the area of the tomato value chain, vegetable 
importers or wholesalers, input importers or wholesalers, vegetable retailers, input retailers, 
tomato smallholders and those from relevant projects working in the field of agricultural 
contract farming. As shown in Table 3.2, the total number of respondents was 146 persons, 
and the majority of the respondents were tomato smallholders who participated in the focus 
group discussions. More specifically, there are three focus groups conducted in each province 
(Battambang and Kandal provinces), and each focus group targeted 15 participants. In relation 
to other target respondents, the information and data were collected from semi-structure 
interviews via face-to-face methods or phone interviews flexible to the real situation in the 
period of data collection. 
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Table 3.2: The number and categories of respondents in this study 
Source: Computations done by the researcher 
3.4 Data analysis 
This thesis consists of two main types of data: qualitative and quantitative data. The 
qualitative data are associated with the description of relationship patterns through the 
classification of governance structures responding to the first main objective. The analysis for 
this is based on the value chain maps conducted with focus groups and key informants in 
relation to social budgets.  
The quantitative data are mostly associated with the PAM analysis. Data collected from the 
focus group discussion and key informants were recorded in the templates. It was then 
entered into Excel worksheets of both private budgets and social budgets quantified through 
various governance structures.   
Additionally, all information used from the secondary data analysis are cited using the APA 
style as specified in the Lincoln University style manual. 
                                                             
 
 
2 The number of smallholders is counted from the focus group participants. In this research, three focus group 
discussions with 15 participants in each group have been conducted in each province (Battambang and Kandal 
provinces). 
N. 
 
Types of respondents 
In 
Battambang  
In Kandal 
In Phnom 
Penh 
Total  
1  MAFF 1 1 1 3 
2  Commune chiefs 3 3 0 6 
3  NGOs/ Stakeholders 3 3 3 9 
4  Vegetable wholesalers 4 0 4 8 
5  Input importers 3 0 3 6 
6  Vegetable retailers 5 5 5 15 
7  Input retailers 3 3   6 
8  Tomato smallholders2 45 45 0 90 
9 
 Alternative contract farming projects  
(outside or inside target areas of the study) 
3 
 Total respondents 146 
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3.5 Ethical considerations 
According to the guidelines of Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee (HEC), “interviews 
with professional persons in the areas of their duties and competence and non-interactive 
observation of these people in the course of everyday life do not come under the scope of 
HEC review”. This means that there was no requirement for HEC approval for this research 
which is to be conducted through two main data collection methods: key informant interviews 
and focus group discussions with selected tomato value chain stakeholders in Cambodia. 
Nonetheless, participation in this study was voluntary and respondents were free to not 
answer specific questions or participate in the interview if they chose. The names of 
respondents were not identified in any part of the research, and the information collected 
was kept confidential and secure. The researcher requested permission from participants in 
advance in case voice recordings were necessary, and these were also kept confidential.  
3.6 Human and safety considerations 
This research was conducted to comply with Lincoln University Health and Safety Protocols. 
Necessary first aid was prepared and carried each time during field data collection. There was 
no travelling at night, and every trip by motorbike used a helmet that was compliant with 
Cambodian traffic laws. All valuable items such as mobile phones and laptops were securely 
kept. The researcher avoided sensitive discussions related to political issues which could lead 
to serious arguments during the focus group discussion. All materials produced in the data 
collection process from focus groups were promptly recorded on Excel worksheets prepared 
in advance to avoid any losses and to confirm their sufficiency for analysis. The data were 
regularly and securely backed up using Cloud or other online storage sources.  
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Chapter 4 
Value chain structures and governance: Results and discussion 
4.1 Overview 
This section illustrates the competitiveness issues faced by Cambodian smallholders as a 
consequence of the aforementioned analytical framework. The section starts with a 
description of the general situation of the tomato market and the roles played by 
smallholders. This is followed by a description of the tomato value chain using the two main 
tools of value chain analysis: value chain mapping and an assessment of governance 
mechanisms. From this, the types of transaction costs found in identified governance 
mechanisms are analysed, based on existing chains and alternative structures that are being 
proposed. These will be used as a backdrop for the evaluation of alternative value chains by 
means of the PAM in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Seasonality of the tomato value chain and tomato smallholder producers 
in Cambodia 
Based on data collected from focus groups and key informants, tomatoes are seasonal fruits 
in both the research target provinces: Kandal and Battambang provinces. The favourable 
months of the year for tomato production are from November to March as the weather during 
this period is not too wet and not too hot, inducing higher yields compared to off-seasons. It 
is reported by focus groups that a major problem faced by farmers growing tomatoes out of 
this period is the high risk of crop damage caused by diseases. As a result, Cambodian-origin 
tomatoes have a short period in the market. From March to October, tomato farmers engage 
in crop rotation, changing from growing tomatoes to other types of vegetables such as Chinese 
kale, cucumbers, egg plants, long beans, lettuces, etc.  
Since domestic tomatoes are highly seasonal, the domestic demand for this type of fruit can 
only be met by importing from other countries at certain times of the year. Based on the 
information given by vegetable importers, the largest percentage of imported tomatoes 
available in Cambodia comes from Vietnam, at around 90 percent, followed by tomatoes 
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imported from Thailand, at around 10 percent. Notably, those imported from Vietnam are 
year round, while tomatoes imported from Thailand are seasonal as well.  
Focus groups have also reported that there are dramatic price fluctuations in the tomato 
market, which have serious effects on their profitability. High prices for domestic tomatoes 
are only received by a small percentage of tomato smallholders at the beginning of the 
harvesting season, while the vast majority of smallholders receive low prices during the peak 
harvesting season. Indeed, focus groups have reported that when the prices are too low in 
some production cycles (including two of the past five years), some smallholders decide not 
to harvest tomatoes and keep them rotting on their farms.  
4.2.1 Tomato value chain maps in Battambang and Kandal 
This section gives descriptive results of the Cambodian tomato value chain. Figure 4.1 presents 
the map of the value chain for tomato smallholders engaged in Battambang province, while 
figure 4.2 shows the map for Kandal province. Owing to their different geographical locations, 
there are differences between input and output flows in Battambang and Kandal provinces. 
In both cases, however, it is important to note that nearly all inputs used in domestic tomato 
production are imported from neighbouring countries including Thailand and Vietnam.  
In Battambang province, input wholesalers import inputs directly from Thailand, making up 
about 30 percent of total wholesale tomatoes in the province, and make purchase orders to 
other Vietnamese input providers from those Phnom Penh who also have roles as input 
wholesalers and retailers. There are four input wholesalers who specifically supply a range of 
agricultural inputs to the main Battambang provincial market, and they supply inputs to three 
types of buyers: input retailers who sell mixed products in the Battambang provincial town, 
input wholesalers who also act as input retailers located in district markets, and input retailers 
in communes.  
Input wholesalers in district towns buy all types of inputs from wholesalers in the Battambang 
provincial town, and they sell to retailers in commune markets which supply between five and 
15 villages (from 30-150 families in each village and each household has around five members) 
in each commune and sell directly to farmers who mostly live near the district town. There are 
one or two input wholesalers in each district town.  
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Input retailers in communes sell inputs bought from two main channels: 20 percent from 
district wholesalers and 80 percent bought directly from wholesalers in the provincial town. 
Their target buyers are vegetable farmers. Notably, only input retailers whose stores are 
located far from the provincial town buy inputs from district wholesalers. Otherwise, they buy 
directly from the wholesalers in the provincial town.  
Farmers buy their necessary inputs used in tomato production encompassing seeds, chemical 
fertilisers, pesticides, trellises, and strings from three types of suppliers: 10 percent of them 
buy directly from provincial market retailers, 10 percent buy from district retailers, and 80 
percent of them buy from local retailers in their commune. The majority of farmers buy inputs 
from local suppliers who allow farmers to obtain inputs on credit based on their trust-based 
relationship. The condition used in this on-credit buying is that the input retailers in their 
commune do not charge the 3 percent interest per month if farmers repay the full amount of 
money within 30 days. Focus groups reported that most farmers who buy inputs on credit pay 
off their debts when they receive cash from a completed sale of their tomatoes.    
Farmers depend on three sources of finance, including 50 percent from their own savings (own 
financial capital), 40 percent from microfinance organizations, and another 10 percent from 
private lenders. In the case of loans borrowed from microfinance organizations, it is 
compulsory for farmers to have collateral such as land or house titles. The interest rates are 
applied differently depending on loan sizes, with the maximum interest rate being 18 percent 
per year which complies with the sub-decree (Prakas) issued by the Cambodian national bank 
on March 13, 2017. If the loan size is lower than USD 10,000, the maximum interest rate is 
applied. It was reported that all smallholders participating in the focus group discussion obtain 
loans in amounts less than USD 10,000. The majority of smallholders borrow around USD 
1,500 for a period of up to 10 years, but less than 30 percent of the total loan borrowed is 
used for tomato production. The rest is used for other seasonal rotational crops throughout 
the year and household needs. Smallholders face much higher interest rates up to 30 percent 
per week for loans received from private village lenders. However, the amounts borrowed 
from private lenders are only for household emergencies and average around USD 300.  
There are five important downstream chain actors in Battambang: vegetable collectors, 
vegetable wholesalers in the provincial town, retailers in provincial town markets, retailers in 
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district towns and small retailers in communes. In Battambang, the number of collectors varies 
depending on the distance of farms to the provincial town. The further the distance from 
town, the fewer the number of collectors. For example, in Thmor Korl, which is about 20 km 
from the provincial town, there are approximately 15 vegetable collectors, whereas in Moung 
Reusey district, about 50 km away, the number of vegetable collectors is irregular and few, 
usually fewer than five. It is also interesting to note that the number of collectors is also 
related to vegetable prices. When vegetables fetch high prices, the number of collectors 
increases and vice versa. Noticeably, all collectors not only buy tomatoes, but buy most of the 
available vegetables in their zone. Collectors transport and sell vegetables collected from 
farmers to two target buyers: 60 percent to wholesalers in the provincial town and 40 percent 
to medium-scale retailers (or small-scale wholesalers) in their district town.  
None of the wholesalers solely trades tomatoes in Battambang. Fieldwork discussions and 
observations reveal that they sell at least three types of vegetables in their wholesale stores. 
Because tomatoes supplied by Cambodian farmers are seasonal, wholesalers trade imported 
tomatoes throughout the year even in the season when Cambodian tomatoes are available. 
There are two main wholesale markets in Battambang: Beung Chhurk market where around 
10 wholesalers are involved in the tomato trade and Phu Puy market where there are around 
15 wholesalers who also trade tomatoes. The quantity of tomatoes purchased per wholesaler 
fluctuates from 500 kg to 1,500 kg per day depending on the availability and prices of other 
substitute vegetables. Wholesalers make a low daily purchase order for imported tomatoes 
and increase the purchase order for other vegetables if there is a chance of gaining better 
profit. Wholesalers in Battambang became involved in trading tomatoes imported from 
Vietnam more than those imported from Thailand and more than the local tomatoes due to 
their year-round availability and quality (shape, colour, less amount of damage, etc.). Thai 
tomatoes are also seasonal in nature. Wholesalers in Battambang buy Vietnamese imported 
tomatoes from wholesalers in Phnom Penh and vegetable wholesalers in the provincial town 
sell tomatoes to two types of buyers: vegetable retailers in markets around the provincial 
town and medium-scale retailers (small-scale wholesalers) in districts.  
It is important to note that all wholesalers in Battambang trade both domestic and imported 
tomatoes (or other vegetables). Unlike this, in Phnom Penh, some wholesalers do not trade in 
domestic vegetables because of seasonality, while some are trading both. Those who trade in 
45 
 
both domestic and imported tomatoes are also flexible and check the prices before making 
any decision to trade or purchase. In the off-season for domestic tomatoes, they check the 
prices of Thai and Vietnamese tomatoes. If either of these can be supplied at a lower price, 
the wholesalers increase their purchase orders quickly. The wholesalers in Battambang 
sometimes do not make purchase orders to Phnom Penh wholesalers for Vietnamese 
tomatoes if the Thai price is very competitive (equal or lower). But, this situation is rare. 
Wholesalers in Phnom Penh cannot escape from trading in Vietnamese tomatoes, and some 
of them are not even involved in other types of tomatoes. 
Vegetable retailers in markets in the Battambang provincial town buy all types of vegetables 
from vegetable wholesalers, and they sell to final consumers who are commonly the people 
living in the town. The volume of tomatoes bought for retail sale per retail store ranges from 
20 kg to 50 kg per day for imported tomatoes. The prices of tomatoes are the equilibrium 
prices and commonly change every day. From observation, there are the same tomato retail 
prices from one store to the next in the same market, and there are slight differences in 
different markets in the provincial town.  
Medium-scale retailers in the districts buy tomatoes from two main sources: 40 percent from 
vegetable collectors and 60 percent from the wholesalers in the provincial town. The majority 
of tomatoes in their stores are imported products, even in the season when Cambodian 
tomatoes are available. Based on the information given by retailers, medium-scale retailers 
have business transactions with every wholesaler in the town, and they buy different types of 
vegetables from two or three wholesalers, with purchases per vegetable type ranging from 
30-50 kg a day. This type of actor sells 40 percent of tomatoes to final consumers living in or 
near the district town, and 60 percent of tomatoes are distributed to commune retailers or 
grocery vendors. It is reported that a majority of Cambodian tomatoes available in the 
medium-scale retail stores is sold directly to final consumers. In this sense, almost 100 percent 
of tomatoes distributed to commune retailers are imported products so that final consumers 
in villages rarely consume local tomatoes.  
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Figure 4.1:  Value chain map3 for tomatoes in Battambang Province (based on primary data) 
There are some notable similarities and differences between the tomato value chain in Kandal 
province and Battambang province in both the input and production side (upstream) and 
output side (downstream) (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). On the input side, nearly 100 percent of 
inputs used for tomato production are imported products, with the exception of financial 
capital. Concerning the output side, domestic tomatoes produced by Kandal and Battambang 
farmers still need to compete with imported tomatoes. The main differences between the two 
regions are on how certain chain actors engage in exchange, thus inducing some different 
flows of inputs and outputs. 
There are four main actors on the input side including wholesalers in Phnom Penh, medium-
scale retailers in the provincial town (Ta Khmau), input retailers in communes and farmers, 
the final users. Input wholesalers in Phnom Penh import 70-90 percent of inputs directly from 
Vietnam and the remaining 10-30 percent from Thailand. These inputs are further distributed 
                                                             
3 The percentages indicating flows are those of products or services receivers, users or buyers. For example, 
tomato smallholders receive inputs from three sources: 80 percent of those inputs from commune distributors, 
10 percent from wholesalers in the provincial town and the rest 10 percent from retailers in the provincial 
town.   
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to medium-scale wholesalers in the provincial town and wholesalers in districts, for whom this 
is the only purchasing channel. Inputs are then resold to medium-scale wholesalers in more 
distant districts. It is noticeable that most districts in Kandal province are farther from Phnom 
Penh, the capital city compared to Ta Khmau town. Because of this, 70 percent of medium-
scale input wholesalers in districts directly trade inputs with the large-scale wholesalers in 
Phnom Penh to supply to retailers in communes whose stores are nearest to the tomato 
producers. A similar story emerges with wholesalers in districts due to the distance to the 
capital city, with about 30 percent of input retailers in communes maintaining direct trade 
relationships with the wholesalers in Phnom Penh, whereas 70 percent of them still find it 
more profitable to receive inputs from medium-scale wholesalers in their own district.  
The majority of farmers buy basic inputs such as tomato seeds, chemical fertilisers, pesticides 
and strings from local suppliers in the commune, at around 80 percent of inputs used in their 
farm, and the remaining 20 percent of inputs can be directly bought from district markets and 
the capital city, 10 percent and 10 percent respectively. In relation to financial capital, the 
processes are similar to those in Battambang, but there is a slightly lower number of loan 
borrowers. The estimation from focus groups is that 35 percent of smallholders depend on 
loans for their farming activities, whereby 30 percent of them use loans from microcredit 
institutes and only 5 percent of them have experience in using loans from local private lenders.   
From observation, the output side in the downstream part of the chain in Kandal province is 
similar to the case in Battambang as well. About 99 percent of domestic tomatoes are 
commonly collected by local collectors to supply to wholesalers in Phnom Penh capital city. In 
the short growing season that domestic tomatoes are available in the market, wholesalers in 
this capital city still import tomatoes from Vietnam and Thailand in the same quantity or 
slightly lower quantity to supply to the large tomato demand in Cambodia.  
There are around 20 wholesalers who are involved in the tomato trade in two main markets 
in Phnom Penh capital city such as Neak Meas market and Psa Derm Kor market. These 
wholesalers supply both domestic and imported tomatoes to retailers around Phnom Penh 
capital city, whereas only imported tomatoes from Vietnam, which are the dominant 
tomatoes in Cambodian markets are supplied to Battambang and other provinces across the 
country. Similarly to Battambang, retailers in the main markets have a trading relationship 
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with nearly all wholesalers to buy different types of vegetables. Excluding other types of 
vegetables, retailers go to buy and transport tomatoes from wholesale stores. They sell 
between 10 and 50 kg per day, and transactions are based on market prices which change 
daily.    
Generally, vegetable retailers in district towns buy only imported tomatoes from their district 
wholesalers to supply commune retailers and sell at retail prices to their local consumers. 
These actors have less involvement in the domestic tomato value chain.  
The information collected from the value chain mapping is vitally important for the analysis at 
further stages. All actors of the chain are clearly shown; the flows of their communication and 
products are detected; and important information relevant to each linkage is clearly 
understood and described.  
 
Figure 4.2: Value chain map4 for tomatoes in Kandal Province (based on primary data) 
                                                             
4 The percentages indicating flows are those of products or services receivers, users or buyers. For example, 
tomato smallholders receive inputs from three sources: 80 percent of those inputs from commune distributors, 
10 percent from district distributors and the rest 10 percent from retailers in provincial town.  
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Table 4.1 illustrates the summary of activities of all actors in tomato value chains in both 
Kandal and Battambang provinces. This list of activities indicates that tomato smallholders 
have the greatest number of linkages with other value chain actors as compared to other 
actors throughout the value chain. They interact with both actors in the input and output sides 
of the market.  
Table 4.1: Summary of actors’ activities of domestic tomato value-chain actors  
Actors Activities 
Input wholesalers in 
provincial towns or in 
Phnom Penh city 
1.Make purchase orders with exporters from neighbouring 
countries 
2.Transport products from exporters 
3.Warehousing  
4.Transport and deliver products to distributors in districts  
Input medium-scale 
retailers in districts 
1.Check input inventory 
2.Make purchase orders to wholesalers in Phnom Penh for 
Kandal province or in Battambang town for Battambang 
province 
3.Warehousing  
4.Sell inputs to retailers in communes 
Input retailers in 
communes 
1.Travel to buy and transport inputs 
2.Warehousing 
3.Sell inputs to final consumers 
Tomato smallholder 
farmers 
1.Travel to buy inputs from retailers in communes, districts and 
in the provincial town  
2.Plant tomatoes  
3.Maintenance until harvesting  
4.Search for price 
5.Seek collectors by phone call and travel to collectors’ houses 
to discuss prices 
6.Harvest tomatoes  
7.Grade tomatoes into different quality  
8.Pack in 10-kg plastic bags and weigh them 
Vegetable collectors 1.Observe the quality and quantity of vegetables 
2.Check the market prices with wholesalers 
3.Bargain price with farmers 
4.Buy and transport tomatoes to wholesalers’ store 
Vegetable wholesalers in 
Phnom Penh or in 
Battambang provincial 
town 
1.Store tomatoes in the wholesale stores 
2.Clean and take the damaged tomatoes out of the plastic bags 
3.Sell tomatoes at wholesale prices to retailers 
Vegetable retailers in 
Kandal provincial town 
1.Travel to buy and transport tomatoes from wholesale stores 
2.Store tomatoes in wholesale stores 
3.Carry out wholesale and retail 
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Vegetable retailers in 
districts 
1.Travel to buy and transport tomatoes from wholesale stores 
2.Store tomatoes in wholesale stores 
3.Carry out wholesale and retail 
Vegetable retailers in 
communes 
1.Travel to buy and transport tomatoes from wholesale stores 
2.Store tomatoes 
3.Sell to final consumers 
Source: Primary data from focus groups, key informants and observation 
4.3 An assessment of current governance mechanisms identified in domestic 
tomato value chains in Battambang and Kandal provinces 
After the specific linkages are identified and shown in the aforementioned value chain maps, 
the next stage of analysis is to investigate the type of governance structure in each linkage. 
The observed types of governance forms are summarized in Table 4.2 based on the typology 
of governance structures from Williamson (1979). This analysis is based on Williamson’s three 
transaction cost dimensions and the other two key aspects: relationship characteristics and 
opportunism. The overall result of this section indicates that all relationships between actors 
across the value chain are reliant on the market-based structure of interaction i.e., those 
mediated by price.  
Starting with the relationship between input importers (wholesalers) and provincial 
distributors, the form of governance here is considered as a market-based structure. This 
relationship is reliant on what Williamson terms a “classical contract” due to several identified 
attributes such as verbal agreement for every exchange, the use of market prices which is 
widely known by both parties and the absence of a third party. The purchase agreement is 
simply made when the provincial distributors make purchase orders mainly focusing on 
quantity to fill their inventory stock and ignoring the quality. This type of arrangement mirrors 
what Gereffi et al. (2005) would call a market-based form of governance, although because of 
the use of trust-based relationships, there are elements of relational governance in such 
transactions as well, with such long-term trade relationships maintained without the use of a 
formal written contract. Both parties play a key role in distributing products, not in 
manufacturing, so only the location of their warehouse is important for their trade, and they 
do invest in other types of specific assets. The transaction frequency is recurrent because it 
can be said that they have regular exchanges, once per month due to the stock inventory of 
Table 4.1 Continued 
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provincial distributors. As they can secure their margins in such a simple structure, it seems 
that these two actors are reluctant to behave opportunistically.  
There are a number of possible reasons that explain the low uncertainty level in the trade 
relationship between input importers and provincial distributors. The first reason for this is  
that both parties face low risk in terms of quality feedbacks by domestic input buyers. In this 
sense, these actors can simply enjoy their margins while ignoring the poor quality and 
effectiveness of their products, as the level of quality inspection in Cambodia is very limited. 
While quality risks are high, these risks do not influence the transaction mechanism as such. 
Low uncertainty for these actors is further induced by stable prices and low demand 
fluctuation because around 90 percent of agricultural inputs distributed across Cambodia are 
imported products (USAID, 2015). 
While the linkages from provincial distributors to commune retailers are similar to the 
aforementioned linkage, the linkage between input commune retailers and farmers is 
different and important to take into consideration for discussion. The exchange of inputs to 
famers is generally carried out in a conventional, market-based way, without any pre-existing 
agreement or contract. Farmers make decisions to buy inputs when needed without any plan 
or purchase orders. They have different transactions for different inputs. In particular, farmers 
go to buy seeds and fertilisers at the beginning of their tomato growing season and travel to 
buy pesticides if their crops suffer from pests and diseases. The location is important for the 
transaction as it induces the differences in costs. The farmers face higher costs if they travel 
to buy inputs from far locations; however, commune retailers are generally local people who 
own their land and warehouse. This means that the investment in site asset specificity in this 
case is really low.  
What makes the linkage between commune input retailers and farmers different from others 
on the input side is the appearance of a high level of uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour 
for farmers, the final users. Unlike other actors, uncertainty in terms of price and quality has 
strong, negative effects on farmers. The lack of price information and the ignorance of such 
information provides for the possibility for opportunism by commune retailers. Because of 
this, farmers pay high prices for inputs with limited chances of bargaining. Another effect is 
the risk of applying uncertain quality inputs. Farmers pay high prices for inputs, but there is 
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an absence of a quality guarantee. In particular, it is reported that certain types of tomato 
seeds bought can yield differently. A high percentage of chemical inputs cannot be trusted in 
terms of quality. USAID (2015) highlighted that 40 percent of fertilisers used across Cambodia 
are counterfeit imported products.  
On the output side, market-based structures are also seen in the relationship between farmers 
and vegetable collectors: The output transactions also rely on classical contracts in the 
Williamsonian sense, inducing prompt decisions in relation to prices, quantity and payment 
method. In this trade relationship, even though there are no specific assets involved, the 
location of tomato plantations can lead to transportation costs. This means that location is 
the only criterion used to measure the cost in terms of asset specificity. The frequency of 
tomato exchange is irregular. The tomato exchange agreements are carried out up to 15 times 
per production cycle until all tomatoes are sold out; however, the transaction frequency 
between the actors in that specific linkage is more than that if the exchanges of other types 
of vegetables throughout the year are included. It is because smallholders shift tomato 
production to other rotational crops, and it is highly possible to trade those outputs with the 
same collectors who buy tomatoes. Farmers are unable to predict future price for their next 
exchanges until their vegetables are completely sold. During the vegetable harvesting season, 
farmers need to make quick decisions to sell their vegetables because tomatoes are highly 
perishable. On-credit sales also lead to high price uncertainty based on the re-negotiation 
made by collectors as they tend to ask for ex-post price deduction to maintain their margin. 
An even worse situation for farmers can occur as well when collectors reject tomatoes sold to 
them even though they could be purchased by them at a low price. This happens when the 
market price of tomatoes is too low to provide a favourable margin for collectors. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that farmers face very high uncertainty induced by opportunism practised 
by collectors, reducing the incentives for farmers to invest in the tomato sector in terms of 
quality, etc.   
Market-based structures are found in other linkages of actors in the output side from 
collectors to retailers as well, but these actors have a better situation as they face a moderate 
level of uncertainty and opportunism in their trade. The classical contract used in their 
recurrent transactions seems to be effective in promoting their long-term relationship without 
the high level of investment in asset specificity. To maintain a long-term relationship, these 
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actors commit to sharing market risks with each other. However, uncertainty and 
opportunism are still found in moderate levels for collectors, while actors downstream such 
as vegetable wholesalers and retailers always enjoy a secured margin resulting from their 
strong bargaining power. Vegetable collectors still face a situation of achieving low or no 
margins caused by quick fluctuations of vegetable market prices. In this situation, the verbal 
agreements that are commonly made the evening before the transaction cannot guarantee 
the agreed prices. This means that the actual prices given by vegetable wholesalers can be a 
lot lower than that in the verbal agreement. 
According to the governance mechanism described above, the market-based structure has 
considerable impacts on farmers as a result of high uncertainty levels linked to the high chance 
of opportunism in both linkages in input and output sides, whereas other actors seem to be 
able to secure their benefits from the same governance structure.  
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Table 4.2: Expected governance structures being used by actors in their tomato trade relationship 
Linkages 
Dimension of governance typology 
Expected 
governance 
structure 
Observed 
characteristics of 
the governance 
structure 
Asset specificity 
investment 
Frequency of 
transactions 
Uncertainty level Opportunism 
Input side 
Input 
importers – 
provincial 
retailers 
-Classical contract 
 Verbal contract 
 Market prices 
 Use invoices of 
purchase order 
 No third party 
 Quantity based 
 No quality 
specification 
 Long-term trade 
relationship  
- Site            : Yes 
- Physical     : No 
- Human       : No 
- Brand         : No 
- Dedicated : No 
- Temporary: No 
 
- Recurrent:   
 Around 48 times per 
year 
 Regular purchase 
order reliant on stock 
inventory 
 Forward buying 
 
 
- Low for both parties:  
 High quality 
uncertainty but no 
checks 
 Both parties 
uninformed 
 Low level of 
perishability 
 Low demand 
fluctuation 
 Good predictability 
 Stable prices 
 Quality does not 
have effects on their 
business  
 High ability to walk 
away does not have 
an effect on their 
business 
- Low: 
 Both parties share 
incentives to keep a 
long-term relationship 
 They set their certain 
margin 
 
Market-based 
Provincial 
input retailers 
– 
District input 
retailers 
-Classical contract 
-Same as input 
importers’ 
- Site             : Yes 
- Physical     : No 
- Human      : No 
- Brand         : No 
- Dedicated : No 
- Temporary: No 
- Recurrent: 
 Around 24 times per 
year 
 Flexible purchase 
orders reliant on 
stock inventory 
- Low for both parties: 
 Same as input 
importers’ 
- Low: 
 Same as input 
importers’ 
 
Market-based 
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District 
retailers— 
commune 
retailers 
-Classical contract 
-Same as input 
importers’ 
- Site             : Yes 
- Physical     : No 
- Human      : No 
- Brand         : No 
- Dedicated : No 
- Temporary: No 
 
-Recurrent: 
 Around 18 times per 
years 
 Face-to-face 
transaction 
 Buyers transport 
products to their 
stores 
 
- Low for both parties: 
 Same as input 
importers’ 
- Low: 
 Same as input 
importers’ 
 
Market-based 
Commune 
retailers – 
Farmers 
- Classical contract 
 No contracts, even 
verbal 
 Equilibrium prices 
 Can sell on credit 
reliant on trust-
based relationship 
 Decision based on 
own experience 
 No third party 
 
- Site             : Yes 
- Physical     : No 
- Human       : No 
- Brand         : No 
- Dedicated : No 
- Temporary: No 
 
- Occasional  
 Irregular, ad hoc 
 One transaction for 
specific products  
 Face-to-face: farmers 
go to buy and 
transport products to 
their farms (no 
purchase order) 
- High for farmers: 
 Equilibrium prices 
depend on 
negotiation  
 No quality 
guarantees for all 
types of inputs 
- High for retailers: 
 Sell on credit without 
collateral  
- High: Information 
asymmetry 
 Retail price 
negotiation 
 Farmers lack 
knowledge and price 
information 
Market-based 
Output side 
Farmers – 
Vegetable 
collectors 
- Classical contract 
 No contracts 
 Equilibrium prices 
reliant to market 
price fluctuation 
and tomato 
quality 
 Can sell on credit 
based on trust-
relationship 
 No third party 
- Site            : Yes 
- Physical     : No 
- Human      : No 
- Brand         : No 
- Dedicated : No 
- Temporary: No 
 
- Recurrent:  
 Around 15 
transactions per year, 
but one transaction 
for one trade 
agreement, and start 
negotiation for 
another agreement 
for the next 
transactions 
 Face-to-fact: 
collectors travel to 
- High for farmers:  
 Perishable  
 Prices fluctuate by 
transactions  
 Very low bargaining 
power (price takers) 
resulting from the 
lack of information 
 Different quality of 
tomatoes are given 
different prices  
- High: Information 
asymmetry 
 Farm-gate price 
bargaining 
 Farmers lack price 
information 
 
Market-based 
Table 4.2 Continued 
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observe, negotiate 
and buy  
 
 Re-negotiation to 
reduce unit price 
occurs very often for 
the sale on credit 
 No collectors in 
vegetable flooding 
seasons 
-Moderate for 
collectors: 
 Quality cheating 
Collectors – 
Wholesalers 
- Classical contract 
 Verbal contract 
via phone call or 
no contract at all 
 Market prices  
 Receive cash 
during product 
delivery  
 No third party 
 Long-term 
relationship 
- Site             : Yes 
- Physical     : No 
- Human      : No 
- Brand         : No 
- Dedicated : No 
- Temporary: No 
 
- Recurrent:  
 One by one 
transaction on daily 
based 
 
 
- Moderate for 
collectors:  
 Prices fluctuate too 
quickly  
 Tomato damage 
 Very low bargaining 
power (price takers) 
- Low for wholesalers 
 Price giver 
 
- Moderate:  
 Market prices, but 
they negotiate for 
big margins 
 
Market-based 
Wholesalers – 
Retailers 
- Classical contract 
 Verbal contract 
 Market prices 
(wholesale prices) 
 Can sell on credit 
 No third party 
 Long-term 
relationship 
- Site             : Yes 
- Physical     : No 
- Human      : No 
- Brand         : No 
- Dedicated : No 
- Temporary: No 
- Recurrent 
 Daily 
 No purchase orders 
 Buyers come and 
buy 
Low for both party:  
 Daily transaction  
- Moderate:  
 Market prices, but 
they negotiate for 
big margins 
 
Market-based 
Source: An analysis result based on primary data collected from focus groups, key informants and observation 
Table 4.2 Continued 
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4.4 The types and quantification of transaction costs faced by tomato 
smallholders in Cambodia   
The descriptive results gained from the analysis of value chain mapping and governance 
structure identification describe areas of possible transaction costs arising in smallholder 
tomato production. This section attempts to quantify these empirically. Following the 
transaction cost economic framework, the transaction costs associated with the above 
governance modes need to be analysed. These are quantified using the three categories 
suggested by Hobbs (1997): ex-ante, during transactions and ex-post. Key variables collected 
for this measurement are in the form of travel costs, commission fees, communication fees 
(both formal and informal), and losses induced by opportunism practised by another exchange 
party (partner). It is assumed that smallholders face each of these costs in every stage of their 
transactions in the whole production cycle from the input output transactions. Data used in 
this work are the primary data collected from tomato smallholders following their exchange 
activities listed in the section of the value-chain analysis. These data are denominated per 
average farm size i.e., 1600m2. 
Smallholders encounter three types of transaction costs in the tomato production cycle. First, 
they incur in the tradeable input transactions. In the loose coordination form with the absence 
of formal agreements between smallholders and input traders, farmers need to observe input 
prices and select the most reliable input traders. It is assumed that transaction costs in the 
form of travelling costs, commission fees, and communication costs arise. Additional 
transaction costs can come in the form of losses resulting from selecting the wrong partners, 
such as input sellers who tend to behave opportunistically in terms of price as well as input 
quality. Second, the transaction costs arise in non-tradeable input transactions. Famers need 
three important non-tradeable inputs such as financial capital, land, and labour. Farmers face 
costs for information about their partners including loan lenders, land renters, and labourers, 
negotiating for favourable service and costs, and renegotiating based on the performance of 
their partners. Third, transaction costs are incurred in output transactions. Farmers face some 
costs relative to the search for information on price and reliable vegetable buyers, price 
negotiation transactions, losses as a result of receiving lower prices than they should have 
received and the bargaining by buyers seeking additional margins. Costs identified in these 
transactions are same as those in input transactions that they commonly incur in the form of 
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communication cost (phone cards used to contact buyers), travel costs (fuel costs used for the 
travel to seek and negotiate with potential buyers) and other additional costs.   
4.4.1  The level of transaction costs on tradeable input transactions 
Table 4.3 shows the level of transaction costs arising on tradeable input transactions faced by 
tomato smallholders. The activities producing the costs are associated with the travel to buy 
inputs such as fuel costs, opportunity costs of time, and food costs. It is observed that the 
transaction costs in input transactions are low, only USD 6.66. The average travel cost per trip 
is USD 0.95 paying for petrol, and there are around seven trips for buying inputs per 
production cycle. The low level of information search for their input transactions seems to 
have negative impacts on tomato smallholders. While they do not face high costs on ex-ante 
information or monitoring the performance of sellers, there is uncertainty, particularly in the 
price and quality of goods they need to use in their production. This results in ad hoc decision 
making. As a result, they have very low bargaining power to negotiate with input sellers in 
terms of price. This means that smallholders pay high prices for products of uncertain quality, 
and with no means to prove a lack of quality.   
Table 4.3: Transaction costs on tradable inputs 
Transaction activities 
Period 
(day) 
Frequency per 
production 
cycle 
Number 
of people 
Unit cost 
(USD) 
Total cost 
(USD) 
Ex-ante: Searching for information about inputs 
Travel  0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls  0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Checking with local people 0.1 7 2 0.00 0.00 
Commission fees 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Losses 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
During the transaction 
Travel to buy inputs 1 7 1 0.95 6.66 
Phone calls 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Commission fees 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Losses 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Ex-post: Renegotiation about inputs 
Travel to renegotiate 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Commission fees 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Losses 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Total (USD) 6.66 
Source: Primary data collected by researcher 
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4.4.2 The level of transaction costs on non-tradeable inputs 
Transaction costs were found in credit transactions among the three different types of non-
tradeable inputs considered in this research. No transaction costs were reported in land cost 
and labour costs because the majority of smallholders grow tomatoes on their own land and 
use their household labour. However, it is possible that despite the absence of this 
information from the interviews, unobserved transaction costs may still exist that are 
associated with labour or land markets.  The opportunity costs for their household labour are 
already included in the non-tradeable input costs. The volume of transaction costs in the 
following description is shown in Table 4.4. 
Smallholders face high transaction costs when they need capital from microcredit institutes, 
especially the costs incurred during the transactions. Before getting a loan, they search for the 
best lenders who can provide them with a loan at the lowest interest and with a convenient 
repayment schedule. During the focus group discussions, on average, it was observed that 
they need to contact around two credit officers by phone around five times, with each call 
costing them USD 1. After making decisions about the lender from whom to borrow a certain 
amount of money needed for their household and tomato production, there is a long approval 
process. Even though most of transactions are the responsibilities of credit officers who play 
a key role in preparing all types of documents, it is found that smallholders still have 
considerable costs. In particular, they are obliged to pay 1.5 percent of their loan for the 
processing fee. They also pay informal commission fees to the local authority for 
acknowledgement of the agreement between them and the microcredit institutes. During the 
loan process, until they receive the loan requested, smallholders reported that they have to 
travel twice to visit the lender in person, involving both fuel costs and opportunity costs in 
terms of their time. The total transaction cost associating with credit transactions faced by 
tomato smallholders is USD 46.94, making up 14.50 percent of the total non-tradeable input 
costs faced by smallholders.  
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Table 4.4: Transaction costs on non-tradable inputs 
Transaction activities 
Period 
(day) 
Frequency per 
production 
cycle 
Number 
of people 
Unit cost 
(USD) 
Total cost 
(USD) 
Land 
Ex-ante: Searching for information about land 
Travel  0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls  0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Checking with local 
people 
0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
During the transaction 
Travel to buy inputs 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Ex-post: Renegotiation about inputs 
Travel to renegotiate 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Sub-total costs of land (USD) 0.00 
Labour 
Ex-ante: Searching for information about labour 
Travel  0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls  0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Checking with local 
people 
0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
During the transaction 
Travel to buy inputs 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Ex-post: Renegotiation about inputs 
Travel to renegotiate 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone call 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Sub-total cost of labour (USD) 0.00 
Credit 
Ex-ante: Searching for information about loan 
Travel to search for loan 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls  - 1 5 1.00 5.00 
Checking with local 
people 
0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
During the transaction 
Travel to request 1 2 2 7.81 31.22 
Phone calls 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Commission fee - 2 - 2.86 5.72 
Ex-post: Renegotiation about inputs 
Travel to renegotiate 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls 0 5 1 1.00 5.00 
Sub-total costs of Loan (USD) 46.94 
Total non-tradeable inputs 46.94 
Source: Primary data 
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4.4.3 The level of transaction costs on the output side  
Smallholders face higher costs in transacting outputs compared to those in tradeable and non-
tradeable input transactions. In particular, before their tomato production reaches the 
harvesting stage, they pay the costs to search for trustworthy buyers who are able to provide 
the best prices. Before making a tomato trade decision, they check with three collectors who 
have long-term trade relationships with them. The average cost for the price checking and 
negotiation is USD 30 per tomato production cycle. To confirm their decision making about 
the selection of buyers, they also try to check with their neighbours, but this does not induce 
relevant costs.  
Even though they have a long-term trade relationship with collectors, it is observed that 
smallholders still incur losses caused by the opportunistic behaviour of those collectors. It was 
already mentioned in the part on the governance mechanism that the price uncertainty is high 
for smallholders due to the high level of information asymmetry. Based on the calculation 
shown in Table 4.5, tomato smallholders face costs of USD 7.32 per tomato transaction as a 
result of price negotiations. It commonly happens that after smallholders have already 
harvested their tomatoes, collectors inform smallholders that they have very low margins in 
their transactions with tomato smallholders and reduce the prices offered. As there is an 
average of 10 transactions made, this results in transaction costs of USD 73.17 per production 
cycle. This reveals the high bargaining power of collectors and the low bargaining power of 
smallholders. This loss is the type of transaction cost to be included in the computation in 
Table 4.5. Noticeably, the computation to find this loss is basically from the amount of 
additional margin asked by collectors, commonly 100 Riel (USD 0.024) multiplied by the 
average tomato sale per transaction at 300 kg and multiplied by the average number of 
transactions that collectors ask for the additional margin which is about 10 times per 
production cycle.   
During the harvesting period, as an agreement between smallholders and collectors is made 
for every transaction, smallholders need to bargain for high prices very often. This kind of 
activity does not create travel costs in terms of fuel cost, but results in considerable time spent 
which can be classified as a form of opportunity cost. The average frequency of this activity is 
around seven days, so this activity costs USD 37.56 per production cycle. Phone 
communications are used for these types of buying and selling transactions. Farmers usually 
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make a call to collectors asking about a meeting time to weigh the tomatoes harvested and 
packaged and for other information about the verbal agreement surrounding the tomato 
trading period. The average of this communication cost is around USD 7 per production cycle.  
In general, smallholders prefer not to sell their tomatoes on credit. However, they cannot 
totally escape this as it is influenced by the seasonality of tomato production with the period 
of their harvesting season being the time of a surplus of tomatoes in the market. In that period, 
there is also a reduction in the number of collectors because of the narrow opportunity for 
generating profits from the tomato trade. The decreasing number of collectors reduces the 
bargaining power for smallholders. Not only do they offer tomatoes to collectors at lower 
prices in such situations, but they also increase the possibility of offering on-credit sales to 
motivate collectors to buy the rest of their tomatoes. This situation leads to the appearance 
of ex-post transaction costs in the form of monitoring costs ex-post to ensure that payment is 
eventually made.  This cost commonly occurs through communication via phone calls and was 
estimated at USD 7 per production cycle.  
The ex-post risk is exacerbated by market pressure during harvest or by opportunism from 
collectors as well. It is found that tomato smallholders face three rounds of ex-post re-
negotiation. As the estimated tomatoes sold in one transaction are around 300 kg and the 
estimated decreased value asked for by collectors from tomato smallholders is USD 0.024 (100 
Riel) per kg, the total ex-post loss considered as the ex-post transaction costs of tomato output 
transaction is USD 21.95 (see Table 4.5 below).      
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Table 4.5: Transaction costs reducing smallholder revenues 
Transaction activities 
Period 
(day) 
Frequency per 
production 
cycle 
Number 
of people 
Unit cost 
(USD) 
Total cost 
(USD) 
Ex-ante: Searching for information about buyers and prices 
Travel  0 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Phone calls - 10 3 1.00 30.00 
Checking with local 
people 
0 7 2 0.00 0.00 
During the transaction 
Travel to negotiate 1 7 - 5.37 37.56 
Phone calls - 7 - 1.00 7.00 
Loss resulting from price 
negotiation  
- 10 - 7.32 73.17 
Ex-post: Renegotiation about inputs 
Travel to renegotiate - - - - - 
Phone calls - 7 1 1.00 7.00 
Ex-post price deduction - 3  7.32 21.95 
Total (USD) 176.68 
Source: Primary data 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter highlighted the structure of the value chain and the types of governance 
structures present. The research adds value to standard VCA by also capturing a range of 
information concerning the effects of transaction costs on the value chain. Tomato 
smallholders are exposed to a number of challenges in their competitiveness. There is loose 
coordination in the tomato value chain and market-based governance is applied for all 
linkages between actors across the chain. The issue of this structure is that here is a high level 
of information asymmetry and uncertainty. In the input side, input distributors upstream from 
the importers to commune retailers care the most about price and ignore the quality of inputs. 
Without any quality guarantee in the situation that smallholders lack knowledge, it is 
uncertain that smallholders receive the input quality they paid for. They are at high risk of 
paying high prices for counterfeit products. On the output side, tomato smallholders have low 
bargaining power. They are price takers who most often accept prices given by their trade 
partners. This is compounded by competition from imported products. Wholesalers secure 
their margins in their trade with neighbouring countries as their supply is reliable. They are 
able to supply year-round tomatoes, while the domestic products are highly seasonal. 
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Imported tomatoes are also of better quality, have better physical appearance and are more 
resistant to damage. The irregularity in trade, low commitment, and lack of trustworthiness 
of the downstream value chain actors also weaken the bargaining power of smallholders. 
When there is price pressure in the tomato peak season as a result of high competition with 
both imported and domestic tomatoes, tomato collectors are not willing to trade in domestic 
tomatoes. A transaction costs perspective helps to quantify the magnitude of these costs.  The 
results show that smallholders in the current governance structures face the highest 
transaction costs in the output trade, which are about four times higher than costs faced on 
the input side.  
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Chapter 5 
Application of the policy analysis matrix to assess the 
competitiveness of the tomato value chain in the context of 
transaction costs 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the policy analysis matrix (PAM) is used to measure smallholder completeness, 
taking into account the role played by transaction costs. The PAM helps to quantify how far 
current production practices are from their socially efficient level. While traditionally used to 
look at the impacts of public policy, the approach here considers the role that various 
transaction costs and market failures may have in the tomato sector.  
This chapter details the computation of the different elements (private revenues and costs, 
social revenues and costs, and divergences) associated with the policy analysis matrix, 
concluding with an analysis of the finalized PAM developed from a combination of primary 
data from participatory sessions with focus groups and secondary data. This analysis serves as 
the basis for sensitivity analysis of alternative governance structures discussed in Chapter 6.  
5.2 Computation of producer revenue in the PAM 
The first column of the PAM quantifies revenues in the tomato sector, contrasting private and 
social prices. Data for private revenues comes directly from focus group discussions with 
tomato smallholders, reflecting the average farm-gate prices received per kg of tomatoes 
multiplied by marketed volumes. By contrast, social revenues use social prices which are 
typically set as the farm-adjusted world price to assess the comparative advantage of 
Cambodian tomato farmers (Hobbs, 1997; Monke & Pearson, 1989). It is also important to 
note that according to the findings in Chapter 4, there is a high seasonality in tomato 
production in Cambodia. In this sense, all private prices used in the computations in this 
section take the average of the prices during the months that domestic tomatoes are 
produced.  
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5.2.1 Tomato price situation throughout the year 
Figure 5.1 shows the trend in prices for different high-end vegetable products in Cambodia 
between 2013 and 2015. The figure clearly indicates the seasonality of the wholesale price of 
tomatoes. The lowest price5 is between January and April, at USD 0.34/kg (1,400 Riel/kg), and 
the highest price is around October, at USD 0.63 (2,600 Riel) per kg. During the main harvest 
season from January to April in 2014 and 2015, the wholesale price per kilogram fluctuated 
from USD 0.34 (1,400 Riel) to USD 0.49 (2,000 Riel).  
Table 5.1 presents estimates of the trend of prices and supply of both domestic and imported 
tomatoes. While imported tomatoes from Thailand and Vietnam are available year-round in 
the Cambodian wholesale market, the supply of domestic tomatoes is highly seasonal. It was 
reported by vegetable wholesalers that tomatoes imported from Vietnam are the dominant 
product throughout the year covering over 90 percent of wholesaler supply, while tomatoes 
imported from Thailand are found in much lower quantities.  
 
Figure 5.1:  Wholesale prices of tomatoes and other high-value vegetables in Cambodia 
(Nuppun, 2016) 
 
                                                             
5 This is the average lowest price for the wholesale market. This graph does not show price shocks that have 
occurred twice in five years when the lowest price received by farmers was 300 Riel per kg.   
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Focus group discussions show that domestic tomato producers receive an average price of 
USD 0.24 (1,000 Riel) per kg during the peak season from the end of February to the beginning 
of March. In this period, 55 percent of the total domestic supply of tomatoes of the year is 
harvested. Because of the high risk of perishability, the maximum price is very close to the 
average price and there is a high possibility of the occurrence of price shocks which can quickly 
lower the domestic price to as low as USD 0.07 (300 Riel) per kg. It seems that this situation is 
caused by the high level of competition between domestic tomatoes supplied at exactly the 
same time to the wholesale market in which imported tomatoes are dominant. It is important 
to note that only a small number of tomato smallholders can harvest and achieve the 
maximum tomato price during the year, USD 0.73 (3,000 Riel) because the period of this price 
is only around 10 days a year. The price situation is also exacerbated by the competition from 
the increase in tomatoes imported from Thailand in the season of domestic harvesting.  
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Table 5.1: Average supply and price of domestic tomatoes and imported tomatoes  
  
Months 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Average border price of 
imported tomatoes (Riel6/Kg) 
1,300 1,200 1,200 1,400 1,800 2,000 1,800 2,000 2,000 1,800 1,600 1,600 
Average wholesale prices of 
imported tomatoes (Riel/Kg) 
1,700 1,600 1,600 1,800 2,200 2,400 2,200 2,400 2,400 2,200 2,000 2,000 
Average farm-gate price of 
domestic tomatoes (Riel/Kg) 
1,100 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,600           1,400 1,400 
Maximum farm-gate price of 
domestic tomatoes (Riel/Kg) 
1,500 1,400 1,100 1,300 2,000           2,000 2,000 
Minimum farm-gate price of 
domestic tomatoes (Riel/Kg) 
700 700 300 900 1,200           1,200 1,200 
Source:  Estimated from focus groups and key informants and Nuppun (2016). Note that the shaded cells refer to the periods in which domestic 
tomatoes are available in local markets.   
                                                             
6 The average market exchange rate: 1USD = 4100 Riel  
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5.2.2 Social prices of tomatoes in Cambodia 
The valuation of social prices is the measurement of comparative advantage or efficiency in 
the commodity system (Monke & Pearson, 1989). Table 5.2 details the calculation of the social 
price per kg. The social price of tomatoes is the c.i.f. border price of tomatoes, adjusted for 
wholesale and farm transportation costs to compare to the domestic farm-gate (private) 
price. The average border price of imported tomatoes in the main tomato-harvesting season 
was estimated at USD 0.29 (1,200 Riel) per Kg or USD 292.68 per tonne. After buying from the 
border, wholesalers transport imported tomatoes to wholesale stores. They face three types 
of expenses in these transactions: a fee for government agencies (including both formal and 
informal fees), transportation including labour and fuel, and storage involving store rent and 
security fees. Wholesalers also have other types of expenses involved with the haulage to the 
wholesale market, such as communication with buyers, marketing and losses caused by 
damage. Adding these fees yields a price at the wholesale market in Phnom Penh for imported 
tomatoes of USD 455.98 per tonne. 
Next, the wholesale price needs to be adjusted to the farm-gate by deducting the 
transportation and handling costs from the wholesale market to the farm. Collectors cover 
costs associated with the transport of domestic tomatoes from the farm-gate to wholesale 
stores including labour and fuel. In addition, there are two sets of margins that are incurred 
for wholesalers and collectors between wholesale markets and the farm gate. This results in 
an adjusted farm-gate border price (social price) of USD 329.18 per tonne or USD 0.33 
(1,349.63 Riel) per kg. Compared to the average domestic price of USD 0.24 (1,000 Riel) per 
kg, this is USD 0.09 (349.63 Riel) higher than the actual farm-gate price received by domestic 
tomato smallholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 5.2: Computation of social prices for tomato production 
N. Activities Calculated result  
1 Border price of tomatoes (USD/tonne of tomato) 292.68 
2 Fees to government agencies (USD/tonne of tomato) 33.33 
3 Transport to wholesale storage (USD/tonne of tomato) 24.12 
4 Storage charge (USD/tonne of tomato) 3.79 
5 Adjusted border price =1+2+3+4, (USD/tonne of tomato) 353.93 
6 
Cost of haulage to share market =a+b+c+d, (USD/tonne 
of tomato) 
102 .05 
  a. Communication (USD/tonne of tomato) 5.00 
  b. Selling and marketing (USD/tonne of tomato) 10.73 
  c. Damage losses (USD/tonne of tomato) 30.49 
  d. Wholesaler margin (USD/tonne of tomato) 55.83 
7 
Adjusted wholesale social price =5+6 (USD/tonne of 
tomato) 
455.98 
8 
Cost from domestic farm-gate to wholesale market 
=e+f+g+h+i+j, (USD/tonne of tomato) 
  126.81  
  e. Transport from farm-gate to wholesale stores 28.54 
  f. Labour 10.73 
  g. Communication 10 
  h. Margin for wholesalers 36.3 
  i. Margin for collectors 23.9 
  j. Damage losses (5%) 17.33 
9 
Adjusted farm-gate social price of tomatoes at farm-gate 
=7-8, (USD/tonne of tomato) 
329 .18 
10 
Average smallholder tomato yield (kg/1600 metre 
squares) 
5,000 
11 Market exchange rate 1 US dollar to Khmer Riel (Riel) 4,100 
12 
Social price of tomatoes in Cambodia at farm-gate (USD 
per kg)=9/1,000 
0.33  
13 
Social price of tomatoes in Cambodia at farm-gate (Riel 
per kg) =11 X 12    
1,349.63 
14 
Average domestic farm gate price in the peak harvest 
season (Riel per kg) (private price) 
1,000 
15 Difference between private and social prices =14 – 13 -          349.63  
Source: Calculation based on price and cost data given by importers and wholesalers 
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5.3 Tradeable and non-tradeable input costs used in smallholder tomato 
production vs the border prices 
5.3.1  Tradeable input costs in smallholder tomato production    
It is expected that the majority of smallholders commonly apply conventional practices in their 
tomato production. Based on the results from focus groups, key informants and observation, 
the approximate average land size used for tomato production is 1,600 m2. Because of this, 
all data related to input quantity and costs are calculated based on this estimated average 
land size. This data is also the average calculated from data given from different types of 
respondents in two different provinces: Battambang and Kandal.     
Table 5.3 illustrates the tradeable input costs used in smallholder tomato production based 
on focus group data and the comparison between the actual costs faced by smallholders and 
the estimated social costs in USD. It is important to note that the comparison between private 
tradeable input costs and social tradeable input costs is carried out by keeping the quantity of 
inputs used in the same land size. From Table 5.3, it can be clearly seen that all types of private 
costs faced by tomato smallholders are higher than those based on estimated social prices.   
There are seven types of variable tradeable inputs used in current tomato production. These 
inputs encompass seeds, urea fertilisers, DAP fertilisers, Kali fertilisers, pesticides, and strings. 
The sum of these tradeable input costs amounts to USD 143.17. Strings that are used for 
preventing tomato plans from strong winds have the highest costs at USD 36.59 in private 
prices of variable tradeable input costs, followed by fuel cost and seeds, at USD 28.54 and USD 
21.95 respectively. Nevertheless, if the costs of three types of fertilisers are combined, the 
cost of fertilisers is the highest.  
It is also important to have a quick discussion on the unit cost and quantity of each input used 
in smallholder tomato production. The unit price of seed is seen to be the highest at USD 
10.98, almost 10 times higher than that of other inputs. However, only two packages of 
tomato seeds are sufficient for producing tomatoes on an area of 1,600 m2. According to the 
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counting work carried out by the Cambodia-HARVEST7 project, there are about 1,250 tomato 
seeds per seed package.  
The total cost of the private prices of fixed tradeable inputs is about three times lower than 
that of variable tradeable inputs, at USD 47.50. It is assumed that more than 50 percent of 
tomato smallholders own three types of fixed tradeable inputs: one tiller for ploughing, one 
pump for water irrigation, and one spraying machine for chemical-substance application. 
Tillers and pumps can be commonly used for up to 10 years, and a spraying machine is 
expected to last 5 years. Not only are these fixed inputs used in tomato production, at around 
30 percent of the total use per year, but they are also used for other types of crop production 
throughout the year, as farmers only plant one crop of tomatoes per year. Owing to the 
depreciation8 and the percentage of the use in tomatoes having to be deducted, the private 
prices appearing in Table 5.3 of tillers, pumps and spraying machines are relatively low at USD 
18, USD 17.50, and USD 12, respectively.  
In terms of social prices of tradeable inputs, because the majority of those inputs are imported 
from the neighbouring countries (Thailand and Vietnam), the social prices of tradeable inputs 
are simply interpreted as the expected farm-gate prices paid for inputs by producers (tomato 
smallholders). Most data used for the estimation of these prices have been collected from 
input importers. The source of this data is expected to be more precise reflecting the real 
situation of the input value chain since it is commonly understood that there is loose control 
of input trading. The exchange of tradeable inputs at the borders is generally done in the 
currency of neighbouring countries (Thai Baht and Vietnam Dong) for variable tradeable 
inputs, while that used for fixed tradeable inputs is USD. However, all currencies identified for 
the trade of tradeable inputs are converted into USD in this study. 
                                                             
7 The full name of Cambodia-HARVEST is “Helping Addressing Rural Vulnerability and Ecosystem Stability”. Data 
shown in the analysis has been received from a key informant who was a specialist of the project. It is based on 
the internal horticultural technical bulletin which is only used for guiding project staff.   
8 Most fixed inputs owned and used by smallholders are generally not used for only one specific production. 
Because of this, it is important to know the percentage of the use of those inputs in tomato production per 
year. Considering this case, the depreciation of fixed inputs is the result of the total cost smallholders paid 
during buying (excluding transaction costs) divided by the period of total use (e.g. expected 10 years for a tiller) 
and multiplied by the percentage used in tomato production. The capital recovery method of Monke and 
Pearson (1989) was not used due to a lack of data.  
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Three steps were taken in the computation of social prices for tradeable inputs. First, by 
keeping the same quantity of inputs used in practice by tomato smallholders (collected from 
focus group discussions), border prices of those inputs were calculated. The border prices of 
tradeable inputs refer to the prices paid by importers to import those inputs to markets in 
Cambodia. Second, wholesale prices were computed by adding the costs incurred in 
transporting products from borders to wholesale stores. Margins obtained by trading actors 
in this transaction are also included. The result of this step is the expected wholesale prices of 
tradeable inputs. The last step is the calculation of the social prices at the farm-gate, which 
were added to the estimated wholesale prices and estimated border prices. The result of this 
is the social prices of tradeable inputs expected to be paid by farmers. The second part of 
Table 5.3 is the illustration of estimated social prices of tradeable inputs used in small-scale 
tomato production in Cambodia.    
The differences between the private prices and social prices of tradeable inputs in smallholder 
tomato production in Table 5.3 show that the total average private price is 34.84 percent 
higher than the total average social price. The variable input costs have more impact on this 
difference. The comparison between the total variable input cost of the private price and that 
of the social price indicates that the percentage of difference is 34.07 percent (a difference of 
USD 23.80) of private variable input cost. By contrast, the percentage of the different cost of 
fixed private inputs and fixed social inputs is only 0.76 percent (only a difference of USD 1.61) 
of fixed tradeable input cost. Interestingly, in the variable input costs, there is a large gap 
between the unit private price of seed, USD 10.98 per pack and the unit social price of USD 
2.8 per pack, whereas the differences between both budgets of other variable input costs such 
as fertilisers, pesticides, fuel and strings are just less than one dollar per unit. Despite these 
small unit differences, it creates a significant divergence between total private and total social 
tradeable input costs due to the tradeable input quantity. In the computation results shown 
in Table 5.3, the quantity of tradeable inputs is kept to equalize the quantity of those used on 
tomato smallholders’ farms.  
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Table 5.3: Tradeable input costs and border prices for the average land size of 1600 m2 
Differences between private prices and social prices  
 Variable input costs Fixed input costs Total 
Divergences (USD) 23.80 1.61 25.41 
Percentage of social price (%) 34.07 0.76 34.84 
Source:  Calculation based on data collected from focus groups, key informants and 
observation 
Note: The expected farm-gate price in Table 5.3 is the social prices of tradeable inputs 
expected to be paid by tomato smallholders in Cambodia.  
Types of 
tradeable inputs 
Items Unit 
Unit cost 
(USD) 
Total (USD) 
Private tradeable input costs 
  
 
 
Variable inputs 
  
  
  
  
Seeds 2 10.98  21.95 
Fertiliser1-Urea 25 0.49  12.20 
Fertiliser2-DAP 20 0.73  14.63 
Fertiliser3-Kali 20 0.61  12.20 
Pesticides 20 0.85  17.07 
Fuel 30 0.95  28.54 
Strings 30 1.22  36.59 
Sub-total of tradeable variable inputs in private prices  143.17 
Fixed inputs 
 
  
Tiller (10-year 
depreciation) 
1 18.00  18.00 
Pump (10-year 
depreciation) 
1 17.50  17.50 
Pesticide spraying machine  
(5 years) 
1 12.00  12.00 
Sub-total of tradeable fixed inputs in private prices  47.50 
 Total for private tradeable input costs (USD)  190.67 
Social price of tradeable input costs 
Types Items Unit 
Unit 
prices 
(USD) 
Border 
price(USD) 
Wholesale 
prices 
(USD) 
Expected 
farm-gate 
price (USD) 
 
Seeds 2 2.8           5.6 6.44 7.41 
Fertiliser 1-Urea 25 0.29 7.2 8.28 9.52 
Fertiliser2-DAP 20 0.54 10.86 12.49 14.36 
Fertiliser3-Kali 20 0.42 8.4 9.66 11.11 
Pesticides 20 0.75 15 17.25 19.84 
Fuel 30 0.69 20.7 23.81 27.38 
Strings 30 0.75 22.5 25.88 29.76 
Sub-total of variable tradeable-input costs in social prices 119.37 
Fixed 
inputs 
  
  
 Tiller (10-year depreciation) 1 15 15 17.25 19.84 
 Pump (10-year depreciation) 1 12.5 12.5 14.38 16.53 
 Pesticide spraying machine (5 
years) 1 7.2 7.2 
 
8.28 9.52 
Sub-total of fixed tradeable-input costs in social prices 45.89 
 Total for border tradeable input costs (USD) 124.96 143.70 165.26 
Variable 
inputs 
Fixed  
Inputs 
 
 
Variable inputs 
 
 
Fixed inputs 
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The results shown in Table 5.3 exclude the effects of tradeable input quality on its costs. Based 
on USAID (2015) and re-reported by Nuppun (2016), around 40 percent of fertilisers which 
are important type of agricultural tradeable inputs used by Cambodian farmers are 
counterfeit products which are informally imported from Thailand and Vietnam. The 
important tradeable inputs mentioned here are the variable tradeable inputs including seeds 
and chemicals (e.g. fertilisers). Reiterating the discussion in the part on governance 
mechanism in Chapter 3, there is a lack of input quality control; ignorance of quality across 
the chain actors; and a lack of knowledge about quality checks resulting in very low bargaining 
power. This has negative effects on smallholders, as they pay relatively higher prices 
compared to prices paid by farmers in Vietnam and are likely to obtain lower yields than they 
would with better inputs (Nuppun, 2016). The relationships between good quality inputs and 
yields is beyond the scope of this research, but it should be noted that the divergences 
reported in the PAM later are likely to be an underestimate in light of this issue.   
5.3.2  Non-tradeable input costs in smallholder tomato production 
Unlike the tradeable inputs, there are no world prices for non-tradeable inputs. Land, labour 
and capital are considered to be domestic factors (Monke & Pearson, 1989). In this study, the 
observed domestic factors are those currently deployed in tomato production of smallholders 
in the total average land size of 1,600 m2 in the tomato production season in Cambodia. This 
section provides the discussion about the three main domestic factors computed and shown 
in Table 5.4. The result of the estimation illustrates that there is a small divergence between 
the private prices and social prices of non-tradeable inputs, owing to the amount of capital 
acquired from microcredit organizations and differences in the interest rate.  
The land value used for tomato production is assumed to be the same in both private and 
social budgets. In this research, land is valued by the estimation of its value in other purposes 
such as rental or sale. Farmers use their own land plots for growing tomatoes, but if they had 
rented or bought from others, they would have paid the market price. Land value differs from 
one region to another, but there is no difference in value across its use in alternative crops. In 
this case, land prices were based on the average value of land used for cash crops. According 
to focus groups, 1,600 m2 land plots can be rented at the price of USD 121.95 (500,000 Riel.)  
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In terms of capital assets, it was assumed that tomato smallholders in this case use loans from 
microcredit institutes. Commonly, farmers request larger loans compared to the total amount 
required for small-scale tomato production. Focus groups reported that the average loan size 
they borrow is around USD 2,000, and they pay monthly interest and a calculated monthly 
percentage of the total loan back to the microcredit institutes. This implies that smallholders 
do not use the whole amount of the loan for tomato production, but use it for their year-
round livelihood activities, e.g., rice, livestock and other crop productions. Based on the 
calculation of tradeable input costs at private prices, tomato smallholders require only USD 
190.67 for a tomato production cycle, so this amount is used for the calculation to find the 
total interest.  
The microcredit sector has just received an intervention from the government of Cambodia 
via the issue of a sub-decree (called Prokas in Khmer) limiting the maximum interest rate and 
effective from March 13, 2017 (three months before the field data collection for this study). 
All microcredit institutes as well as banks are restricted to providing loans with an interest 
rate of not more than 1.5 percent per month or 18 percent per annum. Based on the focus 
groups, the interest rates paid to those institutes followed that of Prokas, and there are a few 
different rates depending on the loan size (already discussed in the VC mapping).  This policy 
distortion produces a divergence between the private and social prices of smallholder 
financial capital that make microfinance-sourced loans artificially cheaper. The social (free 
market) interest rate, by contrast, is approximately 1.65 percent per month. However, 
because the loan size required by tomato smallholders is small, at USD 190.67 under private 
prices and USD 165.26 under social prices, the difference in interest costs is relatively small, 
calculated at USD 8.58 in the private budget and USD 14.87 in the social budget per production 
cycle.  
Private labour costs are valued at the prevailing day labour wage, at 22,000 Riel or USD 5.37 
per day. Based on the number of activities and days multiplied by this wage, the total labour 
cost per tomato production cycle is USD 193.17. 
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Table 5.4: Non-tradeable input costs 
Types of non-
tradeable inputs 
Items Unit Unit cost (USD) 
Total cost 
(USD) 
Private non-tradeable inputs 
Land (1600m2) 
Opportunity cost of land for 
tomato production 
1 - 121.95 
Capital Interest 3 2.86 8.58 
  
 Labour 
  
  
  
  
Manual land clearing 2 5.37 10.73 
Ploughing 2 5.37 10.73 
Weeding 14 5.37 75.12 
Planting 6 5.37 32.20 
Fertiliser application 2 5.37 10.73 
Harvesting 10 5.37 53.66 
 Total for non-tradeable input costs 323.70 
Social prices of non-tradeable inputs 
Land (1600m2) Opportunity cost for other crops 1 - 121.95 
Capital Interest  3 4.96 14.87 
  
 
 Labour 
  
  
  
  
Manual land clearing 2 5.37 10.73 
Ploughing 2 5.37 10.73 
Weeding 14 5.37 75.12 
Planting 6 5.37 32.20 
Fertiliser application 2 5.37 10.73 
Harvesting 10 5.37 53.66 
 Total for non-tradeable input costs 330.00 
Source:  Calculation based on focus groups key informants and results from the policy 
analysis matrix  
5.4 Competitiveness of smallholders measured in the PAM 
In this step of analysis, the full baseline PAM is presented and what makes this adapted PAM 
different is the inclusion of transaction costs. Transaction costs were quantified by the use of 
the mixed framework developed by Williamson (1979) and Hobbs (1997) beginning from the 
two main components of value chain analysis (VCA): value chain mapping and the analysis of 
governance mechanisms. Transaction costs are composed of three aspects as discussed in 
section 4.3: the costs incurred in tradeable input transactions, the transaction costs that 
increase non-tradeable input costs, and the transaction costs that reduce revenues. In the 
earlier part of this chapter (Chapter 5), all elements of the original PAM are discussed starting 
from the revenues in both private and social prices followed by those of tradeable inputs and 
non-tradeable inputs.  
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Overall, in the PAM matrix shown in Table 5.5, it is clearly seen that there are high transaction 
costs that reduce smallholder profits by nearly one-third compared to the situation where 
transaction costs are not incurred. If transaction costs are excluded, smallholder profits are 
estimated at USD 705.14 per production cycle. However, based on the measured costs and 
revenues faced by producers, their profit is only USD 474.86 per production cycle. Transaction 
costs primarily reduce revenues and increase non-tradeable input costs, with each changed 
by about 15 percent. Their influence on the tradeable input costs faced by producers is 
relatively low.    
If the divergences are compared with private and social budgets, there are large gaps on the 
output side, amounting to USD 603 per production cycle. At the same time, it is important to 
note that this divergence on the revenue side is not fully explained by the transaction costs 
calculated above. Less than 30 percent of the total divergence between private and social 
revenues comes from observable transaction costs, with the remainder of the divergence 
(71%) unobserved. Similarly, for tradeable inputs, only 21 percent of the divergence arises 
from calculated transaction costs, while over 79 percent is unobserved. On the non-tradeable 
input side, measured (observed) transaction costs explain much more of these divergences, 
accounting for 85 percent of non-tradeable divergences.  
In the absence of government intervention in the sector, the unobservable effects of 
divergence are assumed in part to be the hidden costs associated with the behaviour of value 
chain actors. It can be seen by looking back to the value chain mapping and current 
conventional governance structure that many transactions are poorly coordinated. 
Seasonality aspects further exacerbate the competitive situation of smallholders. 
Downstream actors, especially tomato wholesalers, have low trust and commitment to trade 
the highly seasonal products supplied by domestic smallholders. Instead, they have better 
trade relationships and better incentives to participate in the value chain of imported 
commodities, especially commodities from Vietnam. This implies that the downstream actors 
potentially have a high level of opportunistic behaviour exploiting the incentives from 
domestic smallholders. This is linked to the high level of information asymmetry downstream 
of the chain as well. All of these factors weaken the bargaining power of smallholders. The 
lack of transaction cost data on land and labour markets could further contribute to the high 
levels of unobserved effects. 
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As these divergences are assumed to be the negative effects of poor market coordination, it 
is necessary to consider how alternative governance structures may influence 
competitiveness and profitability.  This will be explored in Chapter 6 when the PAM is adapted 
to consider these forms. 
Table 5.5:   The result of the policy analysis matrix showing the influence of transaction 
costs on tomato smallholder competitiveness (in 1600m2) 
  
 
Revenues  
 Costs  
 Profit  
 
Tradeable 
Inputs  
 Non-
tradeable 
Factors  
Private budget 
Farm-gate budget without TC (USD)  1,219.51   190.67  323.70 705.14  
Transaction costs in private budget (USD) 176.68  6.66   46.94   
Percentage of transaction costs (%) 14.49   3.49  14.50  
Private budget including TC (USD) 1,042.83   197.33  370.64  474.86    
Social budget  
Social prices (USD)  1,645.89   165.26  330.00 1,150.64  
Effects of divergences   
Divergence between private and social 
prices (USD) 
-603.06   32.07    40.65 -675.78  
Unobservable transaction costs 426.38 25.41 6.29   
Percentage of unobservable transaction 
costs of divergence (%) 
70.70 79.24 15.48  
Source: Primary data collected from focus groups and key informants 
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Chapter 6 
Estimation of the effects of alternative governance structures 
recently introduced in Cambodia on tomato smallholder 
competitiveness 
This chapter provides insight into potential opportunities and strategies for tomato 
smallholders to improve their competitiveness. Three main types of alternative governance 
structures are assessed here: the link between farmers and a sponsor with a formal written 
contract, the link between these actors with informal contracts and links based on a 
partnership approach. These forms are described below and later quantified using the PAM 
to assess their desirability and competitiveness compared to current modes of production. 
6.1 Alternative Governance Model 1: Relationship based on an informal 
contract 
The first vegetable trade model identified in this research is the relationship between a 
sponsor and farmers based on an informal contract. This model is based on the case of Anaya 
farm. Despite the informal contract, the model is different from the conventional market used 
by the majority of Cambodian farmers and also different from other alternative forms 
identified in this study. What makes this model important is that farmers in this model receive 
different incentives compared to those in other models including the current conventional 
market.  
According to Figure 6.1, the sponsor in this model also dominates the transactions from the 
input to the output sides, and farmers take part only in production activities. The sponsor in 
this case is the firm acting as an input supplier, a technical assistance provider, and an output 
trader. Anaya farm has a strong business connection with agricultural input importers as well 
as input exporters in neighbouring countries such as Vietnam and Thailand. This firm also has 
expertise in modern agricultural technology that aims to ensure sustainability and generate 
agricultural income. Unlike the previous model, Anaya farm selects farmers to join its project 
by introducing modern agricultural technology in a plot of land owned by this firm. This 
demonstration site is located near to farmer villages so that farmers can see modern practices. 
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When farmers express an interest in replicating that technology, they are invited to register 
to become a member of a community called a “farmer community” facilitated and established 
by the firm. The farmer community has its own internal by-laws and regulations in relation to 
the performance of members, and to become a member of that community, farmers are 
required to obtain a written official form certified by their local authority up to commune 
level. However, the relationship between farmers and the sponsor related to input and output 
trades is reliant on informal agreement.  
The sponsor supplies all types of inputs to farmers to replicate the new crop-planting 
techniques. In addition to this, the sponsor is responsible for providing all services including 
installation and maintenance. What makes this model special is that the sponsor is able to 
supply those inputs on credit without any collateral and without interest. The performance of 
farmers in this case is monitored by the sponsor’s field staff who work regularly with farmer 
members. As the sponsor is also the output buyer, the payment for inputs is generally carried 
out during the output transaction, in which inputs are paid for by deducting input costs from 
the farmers’ revenues from their vegetables bought by the sponsor.  
All production decisions are mainly made by the sponsor. Relying on its demand projection, 
Anaya farm provides a quota to the community members at the beginning of every production 
cycle. The quota focuses on the variety of vegetables to be produced and the amount of land 
to be used. Because of this, a member farmer produces more than one variety in their own 
land. Under the strict monitoring by field staff, farmers are required to guarantee the supply 
of solely chemical-free vegetables to receive higher prices compared to those of conventional 
vegetables.  
In association with investment capital, there is an absence of microcredit institutes in this 
value-chain model as they are replaced by the farmer community which plays a key role in 
community banking. In particular, all members of this community are obliged to save 20 
percent of their revenues from vegetable production with the community bank, and they can 
request the money back for next production capital. The community is authorized to provide 
loans to farmers who request them for the expansion of their production. This lending is 
carried out without the obligation of collateral, but it is compulsory to pay a market interest 
rate back to the community.  
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Figure 6.1:  Main actors and their roles in the informal contract-based relationship in 
Cambodia (based on primary data) 
6.2 Alternative Governance Model 2: Relationship between smallholders 
and a sponsor based on formal contracts 
This governance form involves the use of formal contracts in transactions between vegetable 
farmers and a sponsor. This form is based on a vegetable value-chain initiated by a sponsor 
called “Natural Agricultural Village (NAV)”, which is a small firm playing a key role as the 
wholesaler distributing a number of chemical-free vegetables in Phnom Penh market as a 
niche product. The business model adopted by this firm was started in 2009, but it failed and 
closed in 2012. However, NAV started this model again in 2014 and it is still running at the 
time of this research. This firm works with a range of vegetable farmers in various provinces, 
and tomatoes are just one of the vegetable varieties. In Figure 6.2, a value chain map 
illustrates the transactions and relationships in this model. It indicates that NAV, the sponsor, 
plays a dominant role influencing all other key actors in the whole value-chain. The sponsor 
has multiple functions in the chain as a facilitator and technical provider in the input and 
production side, and as a trader in the output side.  
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Figure 6.2:  Main actors and their roles in the formal contract-based relationship in 
Cambodia (based on primary data) 
Beginning from the input and production sides, the sponsor starts the business project by 
selecting prospective farmers through a strict screening process based on criteria such as 
experience, performance, and commitment. Farmers who are selected to be members of this 
project are those who have been actively involved in projects of NGOs or the government, 
and commit to joining the project. After selection, the sponsor provides an annual contract 
which is strictly focused on performance in chemical-free vegetable production and higher 
prices compared to conventional vegetables. This means that all selected farmers are obliged 
to guarantee that all vegetables produced and supplied to the sponsor do not use chemical 
substances. The contract between the sponsor and selected farmers are acknowledged by the 
local authority in the farmers’ village and commune. 
At the beginning of every year, the sponsor makes a prediction relative to demand and sets a 
schedule of rotational crops throughout the year for farmers. The schedule specifies the types 
of crops, land size and when they should be planted. Because of this condition, a farmer can 
plant more than two varieties of vegetables per production cycle. To monitor the performance 
of selected farmers, the sponsor employs field staff who have a range of main duties from 
providing regular technical assistance in vegetable production to post-harvest coordination. 
The field staff make a list of necessary inputs to be used, and they engage farmers with 
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appropriate input suppliers who are able to supply inputs at lower margins in comparison to 
other input suppliers.  
With regard to the method of receiving investment capital, the sponsor facilitates farmers to 
receive loans from microcredit agencies without any collateral for loans up to USD 850. The 
loan can be processed in this way due to the formal contract which is considered as the 
equivalent document for that loan size.  However, it is still compulsory for farmers to use their 
property such as land and house titles for loan requests over USD 850. Notably, the interest 
rates applied for this case are the same as those outside the project.  
The sponsor also takes a lead in output transactions. Based on the agreement stated in the 
annual contract, the sponsor is responsible for providing a higher price compared to the 
market price of conventional vegetables and for buying all vegetables produced by contracted 
farmers. The field staff of the sponsor provide the date and quantity of harvesting to farmers 
and transport the harvested vegetables to a wholesale store in Phnom Penh capital city before 
distributing to the retail market. Because of this, there are fewer activities for contracted 
farmers in output transactions. Their main involvement in this stage is to harvest and pack 
vegetables in bags provided by the project.   
6.3 Alternative Governance Model 3: Partnership approach based on a 
formal written contract 
The third model considered is the partnership approach between a sponsor, Dak Dam 
cooperative and farmers. Even though the current practice of this model during the period of 
this research does not involve tomato production, this research extrapolates the potential 
effects on their model from other products into tomatoes.  
The relationship between farmers and the sponsor in this model is highly integrated, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.3. Farmers play a role as co-investors participating in production 
activities led by the sponsor. The sponsor makes all decisions from the input to the output 
transactions, while farmers invest only their certain size of land and enjoy 50 percent of the 
gross revenues gained from that land size.  
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Figure 6.3: Partnership approach recently introduced in Cambodia (based on primary data) 
The sponsor in this case is a group of people forming a firm by sharing investment capital put 
into agricultural production. This firm buys a plot of land to be a demonstration site with a 
location near to villages in order to attract farmers who are interested in the new agricultural 
practice to join the project. To be a member of this firm, farmers need to agree with the 
company to provide their land for the investment project proposed by the firm, and the 
agreement is based on a written-five-year contract certified by the local authority up to 
commune level. After this agreement, all activities from production to output trades are the 
responsibility of the sponsor.  
Table 6.1 compares the three business models. The similarity among the three models is the 
domination of decision making on the entire value-chain by the sponsor, especially in 
marketing and developing investment plans. It is worth noting that the sponsor influences 
production and through employing field staff manages production activities. Another 
similarity among the three alternative models is the use of new technology in crop production. 
Each model attempts to introduce high-tech inputs such as drip irrigation systems, plastic 
mulch, green net, etc.  
Aside from the decision making and the use of modern technology, there are a range of 
differences between the alternative models from the input side to the output side. Starting 
from the input side, only in Model 1 the sponsor acts as the input supplier who directly 
supplies a range of inputs required by their trade relationship with farmers. This implies that 
the sponsor, i.e. Anaya farm, gains profits from the input trade, while the other two models, 
i.e. NAV (Model 2) and Dak Dam cooperative (Model 3), receive no margin from inputs. There 
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are also differences in the flow of capital investment and its incentives gained by farmers. 
Farmers in Model 2 receive benefits from the condition of borrowing from microcredit 
without the requirement of collateral; those in Model 1 enjoy the on-credit input supplies 
made by the firm; and those in Model 3 invest only household labour. 
There are two important differences to be taken into consideration in relation to output in 
the three alternative models. While Models 1 and 2 adopt a focus strategy which aims to 
capture only the high-value niche market of vegetables through the chemical-free production, 
the vegetables produced in Model 3 compete with conventional vegetables. Another 
difference is that farmers in Models 1 and 2 receive their revenues from sales at niche prices 
and proportional to the quantity of higher-quality vegetables sold, while those in Model 3 gain 
a regular 50 percent from the gross revenues as the other 50 percent is the sponsor incentive.  
Table 6.1: A comparison of the three alternative business models 
Characteristics 
Types of alternative governance models 
Verbal contract 
(Model 1) 
Written contract 
(Model 2) 
Partnership 
(Model 3) 
Contract -Verbal agreement between 
vegetable buyers and 
producers  
-Written contract 
between vegetables 
buyers and producers 
-Verbal contracts 
between farmers and 
input suppliers  
-Written contract 
between a sponsor and 
land owners 
Involvement of 
third party 
-Farmer community -Local authority (village 
and commune) 
-Local authority (village 
and commune) 
Contract 
duration 
-Every production cycle -One-year  -Five-year  
Contract 
specification 
Producers 
-Replicate the technology  
-Use all inputs supplied by 
the sponsor 
-Guarantee their farm is 
chemical-free 
-Follow crop rotation 
schedules 
Sponsor 
-Supplies inputs 
-Installs all inputs  
-Guarantees the quality 
-Provides technical 
assistance  
-Buys all chemical-free 
vegetables  
 
Producers 
-Follow the annual 
production schedule 
(crop rotation) 
-Guarantee the supply of 
chemical-free vegetables 
-Only supply to the 
sponsor 
Sponsor  
-Buys 100% of 
vegetables 
-Stabilises high prices  
-Provides technical 
support 
Land owners (farmers) 
-Provide a certain size of 
land 
-Agree with the 
sponsor’s project 
-Agree to participate in 
all necessary activities  
-Receive technical advice 
from the sponsor 
-Receive only 50% of 
total gross revenues 
Sponsor 
-Responsible for 100% of 
investment capital  
-Responsible for 
production technology, 
marketing and sale  
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-Receives 50% of the 
gross revenues  
Ownership of 
inputs and input 
flows 
Producers 
-Buy inputs from the sponsor  
-Replicate the new 
technology 
Sponsor 
-Supply inputs with lower 
margins compared to other 
input suppliers 
 
Producers 
-Responsible for all 
expenses occurring in 
their production 
Sponsor 
-Provides information, 
links farmers to input 
suppliers and facilitation  
-Provides technical 
assistance to farmers on 
input installation and 
maintenance 
-All inputs used in the 
agreed land size will be 
owned legally by the 
land owners after the 
contract period 
Decision making 
regarding 
planting and 
harvesting times 
-Sponsor makes annual 
production schedules 
-Sponsor makes annual 
production schedules 
 
-Sponsor makes 
production schedules 
participated in by land 
owners  
Type of inputs 
used in vegetable 
production 
-Compost fertilisers (bought 
from the sponsor) 
-Green net (not compulsory) 
-Trip irrigation system 
(compulsory) 
-Trellises (compulsory) 
-Strings (compulsory 
-Mulch (compulsory) 
-Organic pesticides 
(compulsory) 
-Compost fertilisers 
(bought from input 
suppliers or made by 
farmers themselves) 
-Green net (compulsory) 
-Trellises (compulsory) 
-Strings (compulsory) 
-Trip irrigation system 
(not compulsory) 
-Grown mulch (leaves or 
rice straw mulch) 
(compulsory) 
-Chemical fertilisers 
-Compost fertilisers 
-Chemical pesticides 
-Green net 
-Trip irrigation system 
-Trellises 
-Strings 
-Mulch 
Source of 
financial capital 
for investment 
-Producers’ own capital -Producers’ own capital 
-Microfinance institutes 
 
-Sponsor’s investment 
capital 
Intervention of 
sponsor on 
financial capital 
-Sell inputs on credit -Links producers to 
microfinance institutes 
-Provides guarantee to 
microfinance institutes   
-Farmers receive loan up 
to 850 US dollars 
without collateral 
-Not required 
Obligation to 
deliver and to 
buy 
Sponsor 
-Provides 10-kg plastic bags 
-Transports from farm-gate 
Farmers 
-Harvest and put all 
vegetables in plastic bags (10 
Kg)  
Sponsor 
-Provides 10-kg plastic 
bags 
-Transports from farm-
gate 
Farmers  
-Harvest and put all 
vegetables in plastic bags 
(10 Kg)  
 
-The sponsor arranges 
all transactions from 
harvesting to sale  
Table 6.1 Continued 
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Price 
arrangement 
-Flexible prices according to 
the market prices of organic 
products (still high compared 
to conventional products’) 
-Listed in the written 
annual contract (almost 
double compared to 
conventional products’) 
-Market prices of 
conventional products 
Source: Primary data collected from focus groups and key informants 
6.4 Costs faced and revenues received by smallholders in the three different 
business models 
This section examines the estimated costs and revenues of tomato production under the 
alternative governance structures and compares these under private and social prices. The 
results are summarized in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 which provide partial farm budgets at private 
and social prices, respectively, with a few notable exceptions. Table 6.2 also includes 
transaction costs in the private budget which are removed from the social budget.  
In Tables 6.2 and 6.3, outputs are valued at the new, higher prices that are obtainable under 
the different governance models. These are assumed to be the same for private and social 
budgets. Tradeable costs include costs from the previous budget in Chapter 5, plus new inputs 
associated with improved production practices. These include the use of mulch, drip irrigation, 
nets, and compost. The prices of these inputs were assumed to be the same for private and 
social budgets given a lack of information to assume otherwise. In Table 6.2, the private price 
of seeds was assumed to be the wholesale social price from the previous chapter, accounting 
for the ability of the governance programs in Models 1 and 2 to obtain bulk-purchased inputs. 
For the other inputs in Table 6.2, the private prices from Chapter 5 were used to calculate 
private costs. In Table 6.3, the social price used in all cases was the wholesale price (the border 
price adjusted by a 15 percent margin). For new inputs, there was no difference between 
private and social prices. For non-tradeable inputs, private and social prices were assumed to 
be the same. 
The other difference between Tables 6.2 and 6.3 involves the incorporation of transaction 
costs for these new inputs in the private budget (Table 6.2). In Table 6.3, these transaction 
costs were assumed to be zero. It is worth noting that the transaction costs faced by 
smallholders in the three alternative structures are a lot lower compared to the estimated 
costs of tradeable and non-tradeable inputs and estimated revenues. Interestingly, there are 
Table 6.1 Continued 
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no transaction costs faced by smallholders identified in Model 3, while Model 1 has the 
highest transaction costs, but they are still low enough that their influence on profitability is 
limited.  
Table 6.2:  Estimation of input costs faced, revenues received by tomato growers and 
transaction costs in the alternative models at private prices 
Source: Data collected from field interviews. M1 refers to Model 1, M2 to Model 2, and M3 to Model 
3 as discussed in the previous section. 
N. Types of inputs 
Quantity Unit costs (USD) Total costs (USD) 
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Variable inputs 
1 Seeds (packages) 2 2 3 3.22 3.22 0.00 6.44 6.44 0.00 
2 Compost fertilisers (kg) 960 960 960 0.13 0.08 0.00 128 76.8 0.00 
3 Strings 30 30 30 1.22 1.00 0.00 36.59 30.00 0.00 
4 Mulch (rice straw) - - - - - - 19.51 19.51 0.00 
5 Fuel 30 30 30 0.95 0.95 0.00 28.54 28.54 0.00 
Fixed inputs 
6 
Tiller (10-year 
depreciation) 
1 1 1 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
7 
Pump (10-year 
depreciation) 
1 1 1 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 
8 
Pesticide spraying 
machine (5 years) 
1 1 1 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
9 
Drip irrigation system (2 
years) 
1 1 1 65.78 71.11 0.00 65.78 71.11 0.00 
10 Green net (5 years) 1 1 1 234.67 240.00 0.00 234.67 240.00 0.00 
Total tradeable input cost 567.03 519.90 47.50 
Non-tradeable inputs  
11 Interest (months) 0 3 0 0.00 7.40 0.00 0.00 22.21 0.00 
12 Land value 1 1 1 121.95 121.95 121.95 121.95 121.95 121.95 
13 Labour     193.17 193.17 193.17 193.17 193.17 193.17 
Total non-tradeable input cost 315.12 337.33 315.12 
Transaction costs on tradeable inputs  
14 Ex-ante TC        22.49 10.00 0.00 
15 During transaction       0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 Ex-post TC       0.00 10.00 0.00 
Transaction costs on non-tradeable inputs (credit) 
17 Ex-ante TC        0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 During transaction       0.00 47.12 0.00 
19 Ex-post TC       0.00 20.00 0.00 
Total tradeable input costs including transaction costs 589.52 539.90 47.50 
Total non-tradeable input costs including transaction costs 315.12 404.45 315.12 
Average expected output 
20 Yield and revenue 4,500 4,500 6,400 0.73 0.73 0.24 3,285 3,285 1,536 
Transaction costs in output 
21 Ex-ante TC        5.00 0.00 0.00 
22 During transaction       5.00 0.00 0.00 
23 Ex-post TC       5.00 20.00 0.00 
Total output after transaction costs 3,270 3,265 1,536 
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Table 6.3: Estimation of input costs faced, revenues received by tomato growers and 
transaction costs in the alternative models at social prices 
Source: Data collected from field interviews. M1 refers to Model 1, M2 to Model 2, and M3 to Model 
3 as discussed in the previous section. 
N. Types of inputs 
Quantity Unit costs (USD) Total costs (USD) 
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Variable inputs 
1 Seeds (packages) 2 2 3 3.22 3.22 0.00 6.44 6.44 0.00 
2 Compost fertilisers (kg) 960 960 960 0.13 0.08 0.00 128 76.8 0.00 
3 Strings 30 30 30 0.86 0.86 0.00 25.88 25.88 0.00 
4 Mulch (rice straw) - - - - - - 19.51 19.51 0.00 
5 Fuel 30 30 30 0.79 0.79 0.00 23.81 23.81 0.00 
Fixed inputs 
6 
Tiller (10-year 
depreciation) 
1 1 1 17.25 17.25 17.25 17.25 17.25 17.25 
7 
Pump (10-year 
depreciation) 
1 1 1 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 
8 
Pesticide spraying 
machine (5 years) 
1 1 1 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 
9 
Trip irrigation system (2 
years) 
1 1 1 65.78 71.11 0.00 65.78 71.11 0.00 
10 Green net (5 years) 1 1 1 234.67 240.00 0.00 234.67 240.00 0.00 
Total tradeable input cost 543.99 503.45 39.91 
Non-tradeable inputs  
11 Interest (months) 0 3 0 0.00 7.40 0.00 0.00 22.21 0.00 
12 Land value 1 1 1 121.95 121.95 121.95 121.95 121.95 121.95 
13 Labour     193.17 193.17 193.17 193.17 193.17 193.17 
Total non-tradeable input cost 315.12 337.33 315.12 
Transaction costs on tradeable inputs  
14 Ex-ante TC        0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 During transaction       0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 Ex-post TC       0.00 0.00 0.00 
Transaction costs in non-tradeable inputs (credit) 
17 Ex-ante TC        0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 During transaction       0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 Ex-post TC       0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total tradeable input costs including transaction costs 543.99 503.45 39.91 
Total non-tradeable input costs including transaction costs 315.12 337.33 315.12 
Average expected output 
20 Yield and revenue 4,500 4,500 6,400 0.73 0.73 0.24 3,285 3,285 1,536 
Transaction costs on output 
21 Ex-ante TC        0.00 0.00 0.00 
22 During transaction       0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 Ex-post TC       0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total output after transaction costs 3,285 3,285 1,536 
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6.5 A comparison of alternative governance structures using the adapted PAM 
The adapted PAM based on the budgets presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 is summarized in 
Table 6.4. The PAM highlights significantly improved profitability amongst all alternative 
governance models and notably less in the way of divergences. Model 1 is the most beneficial 
structure for smallholders. It achieves high returns from a combination of higher prices from 
targeting a high value market and lower input costs. Even though production yields are lower 
because of the focus on the chemical-free market, the production is highly profitable. In one 
production cycle, tomato smallholders can receive total profits (at private prices) up to USD 
2,365.  
In Model 2, profits are nearly as high at private prices (USD 2,321), although revenues are 
slightly lower and costs slightly higher. This model has more in the way of transaction costs 
(see Tables 6.2 and 6.3) that create wider divergences as compared to this model at social 
prices. At the same time, there could be benefits relative to Model 1 on the organizational 
costs of using an informal contract. These were not quantified but would be a good area for 
future research.  
The partnership approach of Model 3 significantly reduces the tradeable production costs 
faced by smallholders, but the revenue-sharing nature of the program leads to considerably 
lower revenues compared to the other models. Transaction costs, on the other hand, are 
considerably lower, with differences between private and social budgets being small. 
Nonetheless, the profits received by farmers under this model are about one-half of the other 
two models. Again, there may be additional organizational benefits from this approach that 
were not quantified.  
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Table 6.4: Adapted PAM for alternative governance structures 
Source: Computation based on primary data 
The adapted PAM further verifies the improvement in efficiency and comparative advantage 
associated with the different governance models. In Table 6.5, computations of EPCs and DRCs 
were made, comparing the baseline and alternative governance models.  In all cases, DRCs 
highlight strong comparative advantage, while the EPC results of the alternative governance 
models demonstrate less distortions from observable transaction costs. 
Table 6.5: EPC and DRC calculations from baseline and adapted PAM 
Types of ratios Ratio results 
EPC-Baseline 0.57 
EPC- Model 1 0.98 
EPC-Model 2 0.98 
EPC-Model 3 0.99 
DRC-Baseline  0.22  
DRC-Model 1     0.11 
DRC-Model 2  0.12 
DRC-Model 3  0.21 
Source: Computation from the adapted PAM matrix (table 6.4) 
Governance structures   Revenues  
 Costs  
 Profit   Tradeable 
Inputs  
 Non-tradeable 
Factors  
Private           
Baseline (with 
transaction costs) 
 1,042.83   197.33   370.64   474.86  
  Model 1  3,270.00   589.52   315.12   2,365.36  
  Model 2  3,265.00   539.90   404.45   2,320.65  
  Model 3  1,536.00   47.50   315.12   1,173.38  
Social         
Baseline  1,645.89   165.26   330.00   1,150.64  
  Model 1  3,285.00   543.99   315.12   2,425.90  
  Model 2  3,285.00   503.45   337.33   2,444.23  
  Model 3  1,536.00   39.91   315.12   1,180.98  
Effects of divergences         
Baseline  -603.06  32.07   40.64   -675.78 
  Model 1  -15.00  45.54   -   -60.54 
  Model 2  -20.00  36.46   67.12   -123.58 
  Model 3  -   7.60   -   -7.60 
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Chapter 7  
Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction  
This research has tried to answer the research question, “Why is Cambodia unable to 
competitively satisfy domestic demand for tomatoes, and is instead reliant on imported 
products?” While vegetables have been claimed to give higher profits for farmers than more 
land-intensive crops such as rice, maize, cassava, etc., this does not seem to be the case in 
Cambodia. This research hypothesises that one of the most influential factors behind 
Cambodia’s low competitive advantage is the presence of high transaction costs. Three 
research objectives were developed to test this hypothesis: (1) to understand the structure 
and practice of tomato value chains in Cambodia; (2) to quantify the transaction costs that 
affect the competitiveness of smallholder vegetable farmers; and (3) to examine and quantify 
the role that alternative governance mechanisms could play in reducing transaction costs.  
This thesis reviewed a range of literature encompassing the Cambodian tomato sector and its 
value chains, a number of key value chain theories, a review of relevant theory on transaction 
costs and governance, and the use of the policy analysis matrix (PAM) for quantitative 
analysis.  An important contribution of this research has been to build on past research that 
has tried to quantify different types of transaction costs in the value chain. This research 
partially draws on the work of Williamson and Hobbs, while also trying to extend the role that 
PAMs could play in the context of transaction costs, following the earlier work of Kydd et al. 
(1997). The adapted PAMs generated in this thesis try to better address both transaction costs 
and the role of different governance measures in reducing the market failures experienced by 
smallholders, and provide a quantitative evidence base to support policymaking among the 
public and private sectors alike.   
The following sections review some of the key findings and provide some additional guidance 
for policy, private investment, and future research.  
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7.2 Research synthesis and conclusions 
The first stage of analysis in this study provided a descriptive background of the tomato value 
chain and governance structure in every linkage across the chain. A full insight into a broad 
range of problems was detected and a key insight of this research was quantifying the 
magnitude of transaction costs, and proposing alternative governance mechanisms that 
reduce them. By doing so, the values of transactions can be precisely illustrated and measured 
in the types of transactions (information, negotiation and monitoring) faced by farmers. In 
terms of the tomato value chain in Cambodia, this research indicated that the highest level of 
transaction costs arose in output transactions, followed by non-tradeable input transactions, 
whereas the value of those incurred in tradeable transactions were much smaller, at USD 
176.68, USD 46.94 and  USD 6.66, respectively. The total observable transaction costs faced 
by tomato smallholders reduced the profits of smallholder farmers by nearly one-third.   
The second stage of the analysis in this research attempted to investigate and measure the 
full range of challenges faced by smallholders. The framework of the policy analysis matrix 
was helpful in measuring the occurrence of transaction costs in output transactions, in 
tradeable input transactions and in non-tradeable input transactions. The PAM revealed that 
both observable transaction costs and unobservable costs create divergences from the 
socially optimal level of profit. These unobservable costs are much higher on the output and 
tradeable input sides, representing 71 percent of the total divergence in output transactions 
and 79 percent of total divergence in tradeable inputs. By contrast, unobservable transaction 
costs comprise just over 15 percent of the total divergence in non-tradeable inputs. These 
unobserved costs could come from a variety of market and coordination failures in the value 
chain and warrant further research to quantify. The adapted PAM result indicates that profits 
at private prices (which include transactions costs) are substantially lower than optimal profits 
at social prices, with transactions costs reducing private profits by almost 60 percent.  
Computations of domestic resource costs (DRC) indicate that tomato production has a 
comparative advantage over imports, even at the baseline. However, a variety of market 
failures impair the ability of smallholders to capitalize on this. Alternative governance patterns 
could improve competitiveness versus imported products and increase smallholder profit. The 
adapted PAM used in this study further allowed a quantification across alternative governance 
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structures with the current structure. The PAM indicated that smallholders have a greater 
chance to be better off by moving from the current structures to another two higher forms: 
namely either contracting with an informal contract or through a written contract. These two 
models provide greater comparative advantage relative to a partnership approach. These 
governance structures provide better market coordination that could reduce transaction costs 
and increase profit. However, the ability of smallholders to take advantage of these 
alternative marketing forms depends on the relative cost of coordination, which could be 
quite high.  
The complete result of this value chain study suggests a few interventions that could be taken. 
From a policy standpoint, improving the coordination among value chain actors should be a 
priority. The private sector should be encouraged to develop tighter links with smallholders. 
The projects of the government as well as NGOs should also focus on market coordination 
rather than just intervening in new technology. The motivation to integrate Models 1 and 2 is 
also beneficial. Model 1 takes great input coordination, but it is still at high risk due to the 
informal contract, and it is the opposite for Model 2. Sponsors working in Model 1 have a role 
as input traders ensuring input quality, appropriate input-use techniques as well as input 
prices for their selected farmers. Model 2 focuses attention on the output coordination with 
the secured output price for farmers through a written contract. The combination of these 
two models can lead to a higher form of vertical coordination for both the input and output 
sides. This helps orient both the lead firms, sponsors and producers and farmers to share risks 
and commit to obtaining long-term incentives. It is also important for the government to 
consider formalizing horizontal coordination among farmers to increase their bargaining 
power.  
7.3 Limitations and future research 
The researcher has identified two potential limitations of this research and these areas are 
suggested for future research. First, the transaction costs quantified in this study are only 
those exposed by smallholders, while those arising in the transaction costs of other actors 
have not yet been included. It is expected that other actors also face transaction costs. 
Quantifying the total transaction costs value across the chain and comparing those faced by 
others would bring more insights into promising possible actions in the value chain. Second, 
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and linked to the first gap, this research has identified the total measurable costs associated 
with transaction costs, but there remain other unobservable costs that create divergences 
that are still to be investigated. As the unobservable costs are significantly huge in value, up 
to 66 percent of the total transaction costs affecting smallholders’ tomato productions in 
Cambodia, future research may play a role in initiating a new framework for detecting them 
and for explaining how they occur. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Data collection checklist 
This checklist is prepared to collect data for the research title, “Measuring smallholder competitiveness 
in the vegetable value chain in Cambodia: A transaction cost perspective”. This checklist follows the 
chronological order of expected findings responding to the main research objectives. In each section, 
four important elements are included: the purpose of each section, the expected respondents, the 
checklist of data to be collected, methods used to collect data and the responsibility of the data 
collector team.   
1. Tomato value chain mapping 
Purpose The value chain map is to be produced to understand the characteristics of tomato 
value chains in Cambodia.  
Respondents 15 tomato growing farmers and key actors 
Questions 1. Who are the actors?  
2. Their location? 
3. Distance (km) from each actor? 
4. Average cost of transportation? 
5. Transport means? 
6. Activities of each actor? 
7. Numbers of each actor? 
8. Road condition? 
9. Information flow? 
10. Monetary flow? 
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Maps of Cambodia, Battambang and Kandal 
 Transparent flipcharts with a number of layers 
  Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of all different stages of maps being produced 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
 Key informant: to check with other actors whether the information given 
by farmers is correct. 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers 
 One assistant 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
The activity will start with the introduction of the purpose of value chain mapping 
introduced by the researcher. Then, show the map and point out the place of 
meeting. In this stage, the researcher shows some of important locations such as 
towns (Phnom Penh, Battambang town or Kandal provincial centre). After that, the 
researcher proposes the first question about the stakeholders, “Who are the input 
suppliers, middlemen, retailers etc.?” and follows the questions listed above.   
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1.1 Seasonal calendar of tomatoes 
Purpose This tool is used to get more insight into the activities of farmers in different 
seasons. This exercise can provide the first ideas about the opportunity cost taken 
by farmers throughout the different seasons of the year. 
Respondents -Same participants as in the previous section  
Questions 1. What is the actual period of the rainy seasons and dry seasons in your areas?  
2. What are your main activities of the year? (rice, crops, livestock, labour…) 
3. List all main activities 
4. If there are some changes in the terms of activities from one season to another, 
what are the reasons?  
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts which have the seasonal calendar sheets already prepared 
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
The explanation of the sheets of the seasonal calendar (prepared in advance on 
the flipcharts) is the beginning of the exercise. With the question checklist, list all 
main activities given by participants in the activity columns. Give 10 marks to every 
column of the months for each activity for the busiest period, and give 0 marks for 
those of each activity, if there is no activity or they are not busy at all.  
The facilitator encourages the discussion by selecting one of the most popular 
participants to be the facilitator for giving the marks. During the discussion, the 
facilitator also needs to take notes and ask the follow up question “reasons for 
giving marks”.   
 
Template of seasonal calendars used in this study 
N. Activities 
Months 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Rain?             
2 Dry?             
3 Rice?             
4 Crop 1-what?             
5 Crop 2-what?             
6 Crop 3-what?             
7 Livestock 1-what?             
8 Livestock 2-what?             
9 Livestock 3-what?             
10 Labour 1-what?             
11 Labour 2-what?             
12 Other sources of income?...             
13 Prices of tomatoes (Riel/kg)             
14 Yields of tomatoes              
15 Road conditions             
16 ………………………………………………             
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2. Description of governance structures  
2.1 The coordination between input suppliers and farmers 
Purpose -To identify the relationship patterns among tomato chain actors  
Respondents 15 tomato farmers for a focus group  
Questions 1. What are the inputs used in your tomato production? How do you know the 
importance of those inputs/ why do you use those inputs?  
2. Who and where do you buy them from? Do you buy different inputs from 
different places or from only one supplier? Why? 
3. How many times per production cycle do you buy inputs? Do you buy inputs from 
the same suppliers you have bought for the previous production cycle or years? 
If yes or no, why? 
4. If you buy from the same suppliers for years, what type of contract do you use? 
Why? When do you pay (cash and receive the products)? 
5. If you have a contract, what is included in the contract (delivery time, quality, 
quantity, tolerance levels, guarantee, contract duration)? Is it in a written form?  
6. Is there the involvement of a third party? If yes, who and what are their roles? 
7. Do you make a purchase order before buying or just go and buy? Why?  
8. What are the criteria used for making a decision to buy products (quality, price, 
others)?  
9. In the case where you have a contract with your suppliers, what are the 
differences between your current suppliers and other suppliers?  
10. Have you had any problems in terms of changing terms in contracts relative to 
price, quality or others? How do you deal with them?  
11. When is the quality measured? By whom?  
12. What are the specific terms used in the agreement in terms of quality?  
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
The focus group facilitator leads the discussion beginning with specific types of 
inputs used in tomato production. After this, the facilitator asks questions and 
encourages diverse answers from the group for every question. During this 
discussion, the facilitator groups the answers due to the differences and asks for 
reasons behind the differences. After finishing this section, it is important to make a 
brief summary to make sure that all the information is correct and well understood.  
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2.2 The coordination between farmers and buyers 
Purpose -To identify the relationship patterns among tomato chain actors  
Respondents 15 tomato farmers for a focus group 
Questions 1. How many potential tomato middlemen are there in your area? Who are they? 
How far away is their location? (Also ask in the mapping session) 
2. How do you know them?  
3. What are the criteria used to select one of them (price, trust, easy 
communication, easy delivery, relationship, prompt payment and others)? 
4. What type of contract is used in your trade relationship (written or verbal)? 
What is included in your contract (price, quality, quantity, delivery time 
tolerance levels and others)?  
4.1. Who set the price? 
4.2. What are specifications involved in quality? Who measures it? When? 
4.3. When and how do you know the total volume to be bought?    
5. Is there the involvement of a third party? If yes, who and what are their roles? 
6. Have you experienced re-negotiation? What is it for? How do you solve that 
problem?  
7. Have you experienced changing your buyers? If yes, what are the reasons?  
8. What are the differences between your current buyer and other middlemen?   
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
Same as section 2.1 
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3. Production costs for farmers 
 3.1 Tradeable input costs 
Purpose -To measure the production costs of tomato production 
Respondents Same focus group as in section 2.1 
Questions What are the costs of your inputs per production cycle?  
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
As the inputs are already listed in the section 1 of the focus group discussion, they 
are relisted in the template of tradeable input costs on the flipcharts by a research 
assistant (see the table below). To begin this exercise, the participants are divided 
into 3 different groups based on production scale. Each group is required to assign 
one facilitator who is responsible for leading the discussion to find the quantity and 
unit price of each input utilised in the tomato production. After that, the researcher 
facilitates making a calculation to find total costs. This stage provides an opportunity 
to see the different results among the three groups. Next, a representative from 
each group is requested to do a presentation and answer questions raised by other 
groups. This leads to understanding the reasons there are differences in the costs of 
tradeable inputs.   
 
Template used for collecting data of tradeable input costs for this study  
N. Items Quantity Unit price (R) Total (R) 
Variable costs 
 Seed    
 Fertiliser1    
 Fertiliser2    
 Fertiliser3    
 Herbicide1    
 Herbicide2    
 Herbicide3    
 Insecticide 1    
 Insecticide 2    
 Insecticide 3    
 Weedicide    
 Water drip system    
 Plastic mulch    
 Trellises    
     
     
     
     
Fixed cost (farm equipment) 
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 Tillers (depreciation…years)    
 Pump (depreciation ...years)    
     
     
     
     
Total  
 
3.2 Non-tradeable input costs 
Purpose -To measure the production costs of tomato production 
Respondents Same focus group as in section 2.1 
Questions What are the costs of your non-tradeable inputs per production cycle?  
             - Land: Owned or rented? How much per production cycle? 
             - Labour: If hired, how much per production cycle? 
 - Credit for capital: How much per production cycle including interest rate? 
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
To begin this exercise, the participants are divided into 3 different groups based on 
production scale. Each group is required to assign one facilitator who is responsible 
for leading the discussion to find the quantity and unit price of each input utilised in 
the tomato production. After that, the researcher facilitates making a calculation to 
find total costs. This stage provides an opportunity to see the different results 
among the three groups. Next, a representative from each group is requested to do 
a presentation and answer questions raised by other groups. This leads to 
understanding the reasons why there are differences in the costs of tradeable 
inputs.   
 
Template used for collecting data of non-tradeable input costs for this study  
N. Items 
Quantity/ 
Days 
Opportunity 
costs/ 
interest rate 
Unit price (R) Total (R) 
1 Land     
2 Loan     
Labour (non-wage household labour) 
 Manual land clearing     
 Ploughing     
 Harrowing     
 Weeding     
 Planting     
 Fertiliser application     
 Herbicide application     
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 Insecticide application     
 Bird scaring     
 Harvesting     
 Packing     
 Cleaning     
 Grading     
 Loading of-loading     
 Transport     
Total  
Labour non-household member (wage) 
 Manual land clearing     
 Ploughing     
 Harrowing     
 Weeding     
 Planting     
 Fertiliser application     
 Herbicide application     
 Insecticide application     
 Bird scaring     
 Harvesting     
 Packing     
 Cleaning     
 Grading     
 Loading of-loading     
 Transport     
      
Total  
 
4. Output prices 
Purpose -To measure the production costs of tomato production 
Respondents Same focus group as in section 2.1 
Questions -Price of tomatoes per Kg? Minimum and maximum? 
-Average total volume (kg) per production cycle? Minimum and maximum? 
-Average total volume (kg) sold per production cycle? Minimum and maximum? 
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
Same as section 3.2 
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Template used for collecting the data of the average returns gained from tomato production for this 
study  
Seasons 
Average 
quantity (kg) 
Minimum 
quantity (kg) 
Maximum quantity 
(kg) 
Unit price 
(Riel/Kg) 
Total revenue 
(Riel) 
Season 1      
Season 2      
Season 3      
Season 4      
 
5. The transaction costs incurred in the tomato value chain 
5.1 Transaction costs added to tradeable input costs   
Purpose -To measure transaction costs adding to the tomato production 
Respondents Same focus group as in section 2.1 
Questions Information searching costs (before the transaction-ex ante) 
1.   How many days on average do farmers need to search for input suppliers? 
(opportunity cost) 
2.   How do they know the input suppliers? (from neighbours/NGOs/others-what?) 
3.   Is there any travel involved to search for input suppliers? If so, how many trips? 
What is the cost per trip? How many people join the trip (opportunity cost)? 
Total costs for transportation? 
4.   Are there any phone communications? If so, how often do they call or message? 
What is the average cost per call or message? 
Negotiation costs added to tradeable inputs 
5.   Do farmers need transport to buy inputs from sellers? If so, what is the average 
cost per time? How many times per production cycle? 
6.   How far are the input shops from their home? 
7.   Do they use different trips for buying different types of inputs? If so, how many 
times on average?  
Monitoring costs added to tradeable inputs 
8. Have they experienced changing the products bought in terms of quality? If so, 
how? Are there any trips to change? Are there any phone communications? 
Total costs? 
 
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities 
and 
responsibility 
Same as in section 3.2 
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Template used to measure transaction costs incurred in farm-gate budgets in the current structure 
N. Type of variables 
Period 
(days) 
Opportunity 
costs (Riel/ 
days) 
How often? 
Cost per 
time? 
N. of 
people 
Total 
Information searching costs (ex-ante) 
1 Searching for 
input suppliers 
      
2 Travel costs       
3 Phone calls       
Negotiation costs added to tradeable inputs (during the transaction of delivery) 
5 Travel costs       
6 Phone calls       
Monitoring costs added to tradeable inputs 
7 Travel costs       
8 Phone calls       
Total       
    
5.2 Transaction costs added to non-tradeable input costs 
Purpose -To measure transaction costs adding to the tomato production 
Respondents Same focus group as in section 2.1 
Questions Land 
1.  If they rent land for tomato production, how many days do they spend on 
searching for the appropriate location they want? How often do they change 
the land and find another? (opportunity cost) 
2.  Is there any commission for assistants to search for land? If so, how much per 
production cycle? (commune/village chief signatures) 
Labour 
3.  How many family members are involved in tomato production (total average 
working day for each)? (Opportunity cost) 
4.  If they employ people from outside, where are they from? How do farmers 
search for them? Phone communication? Travel to negotiate? Any agencies 
assisting to search for them (commission cost)? Total cost?  
Credit 
5.  If they use credit for production capital, how do farmers know which credit 
institute to borrow from (neighbour/ NGOs/ microcredit staff/others)? How 
many days do they spend on getting credits?  
6.  Is there any phone communication? What is the average communication cost?  
7.  Is there any travel? How many times and how far? What is the average cost per 
trip? (Add opportunity cost) 
8.  Is there any commission involved in borrowing (village/ commune chief 
signature)?  
9.  How do they pay the interest rate? Travel to the microcredit office/bank or via 
a credit officer? 
 
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
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 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities and 
responsibility 
Same as in section 3.2 
 
Template used to measure transaction costs in non-tradeable input costs 
N. Type of variables 
Period 
(days) 
Opportunity 
costs (Riel/ 
days) 
How often? 
Cost per 
time? 
N. of 
people 
Total 
Land 
Information searching costs (ex-ante) 
1. Searching for 
land 
      
2 Travel costs       
3 Phone calls       
Negotiation costs added to tradeable inputs (during the transaction of delivery) 
4 Travel costs       
5 Phone calls       
6 Commission costs       
Monitoring costs (ex-post) 
7 Travel costs       
8 Phone calls       
Sub-total for Land costs       
Labour 
Information searching costs (ex-ante) 
9 Searching for 
labour 
      
10 Travel costs       
11 Phone calls       
12 Commission costs       
Negotiation costs (during finding and renting land) 
13 Travel costs       
14 Phone calls       
15 Commission costs       
Monitoring costs (ex-post) 
16 Travel costs       
17 Phone calls       
18 Commission costs       
Sub-total for labour       
Credit 
Information searching costs (ex-ante) 
19 Searching for 
lenders 
      
20 Travel costs       
21 Phone calls       
22 Commission costs       
Negotiation costs (during finding and renting land) 
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23 Travel costs       
24 Phone calls       
25 Commission costs       
Monitoring costs (ex-post) 
26 Travel costs       
27 Phone calls       
28 Commission costs       
Sub-total for credit 
costs 
      
Grand total       
 
5.3 Transaction cost effects on output prices 
Purpose -To measure transaction costs affecting the returns on tomato production 
Respondents Same focus group as in section 2.1 
Questions Information costs affecting output prices 
1.Searching for buyers: When to search (before/during planting or during the 
harvesting period)? How many days in total (opportunity cost)?  
2.If they do not plant tomatoes, what do they spent their time on (opportunity 
cost)? How much can they earn per day? 
3.Is there any travel to search for buyers? If so, how many trips? What is the cost 
per trip? How many people join the trip (opportunity cost)? Total costs for 
transportation? 
4.Are there any phone communications? If so, how often do they call or 
message? What is the average cost per call or message? 
Negotiation costs (during the transactions) 
5.Do farmers transport their tomatoes to the buyers’ places? If so, what is the 
average cost per transportation (fuel)? How many people are involved in 
transporting and how long (opportunity cost)? Total transportation costs 
including opportunity cost?  
6.Do you buy food which is not normal for your daily life? If so, what is the 
average cost?  
7.Are there any commission costs incurred during transportation (police check 
points)? If so, how much per transportation? 
8.Are there any phone communications during transportation? If so, what is the 
average cost for that?  
9.What is the quality maintenance equipment needed for transportation? How 
much in total per transportation involving all buying costs (transportation, 
communication….., opportunity cost)? 
Monitoring costs (After the transaction) 
10. Do farmers get paid after the product is delivered? If so, how many days?  
11. What are the payment methods?  
12. Is there any travel to deal with this? What is the average cost for fuel and 
phone calls? 
13. Are there any re-negotiations in terms of price? How are these dealt with? 
Method and 
materials  
-Material list: 
 Flipcharts  
 Permanent pens/ markers 
 Voice recorders 
 Camera: to take photos of the output 
-Facilitation method:  
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 Focus group 
-Number of facilitators: 2 persons 
 Researchers (facilitator) 
 One assistant (assisting with the materials and recording) 
Activities and 
responsibility 
Same as in section 3.2 
 
Template used for quantifying transaction costs affecting the returns from tomato production  
N. Type of variables 
Period 
(days) 
Opportunity 
costs (Riel/ 
days) 
How many 
times? 
Cost per 
time? 
N. of 
people 
Total 
Information searching costs (ex-ante) 
1. Searching for 
input buyers 
      
2 Travel costs       
3 Phone calls       
Negotiation costs added to tradeable inputs (during the transaction of delivery) 
5 Travel costs       
6 Phone calls       
7 Commission       
Monitoring costs added to tradeable inputs 
8 Travel costs       
9 Phone calls       
10 Commission       
Total       
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Annex 2: Semi-structured interview for key informants 
This is a section prepared to find the social budgets of the tomato trade in Cambodia. While the data 
of previous sections are mostly collected from value chain actors, especially farmers, this checklist is 
for the semi-structured interview to be conducted with non-value chain actors such as NGOs, 
government officers (Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Commerce) and vegetable importers. It 
is noticeable that most of the questions in this section are similar to those listed in section 2-5 as this 
section plays an important role in capturing different effects of the current governance and the 
alternative forms.  
6. Social budgets of the tomato value chain 
6.1 Current market (Social budget) 
Purpose -To find a social budget (social output costs and tradeable input costs) 
Respondents -Importers 
Methodology -Semi-structured interview with the checklist below 
-Facilitator: Researcher 
Activities Market 
exchange rate 
Equilibrium 
exchange rate 
Import parity 
per ton 
Unit cost Total cost per 
kg 
Output price 
Insurance      
Import duty      
Fees to gov’t 
agency 
     
Stevedoring      
Transport to 
storage 
     
Fumigation      
Agent’s 
charge 
     
Total import 
cost 
     
Tradeable inputs 
N. Items Quantity Unit price (R) Total (R) 
Variable costs 
1 Seed    
2 Fertiliser1    
3 Fertiliser2    
4 Fertiliser3    
5 Herbicide1    
6 Herbicide2    
 Herbicide3    
 Insecticide 1    
 Insecticide 2    
 Insecticide 3    
 Weedicide    
 Water drip system    
 Plastic mulch    
 Trellises    
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Fixed cost (farm equipment) 
 Tillers (depreciation 15y)    
 Pump (depreciation …..)    
     
     
     
     
Total  
  
6.2 Better market (border price)  
6.2.1 Tradeable input costs 
Purpose -To find the global costs of tradeable inputs to compare with the real costs 
faced by Cambodian farmers.  
Respondents NGOs, government officers, importers and secondary data 
Questions 1. What are the inputs used in tomato production?  
2. What are the border prices on average? Minimum and Maximum? 
3. Are they changed by seasons? If so, what are the prices for tradeable inputs 
by seasons? Minimum and maximum?  
4. For the imported products, what are the average transportation costs per kg 
from the border to the market? Maximum and minimum?  
5. Are there any commission costs? How much?  
6. In Cambodia, all agricultural input products are imported without any tariff 
barriers. Is it true for inputs used for tomato production? If not, what do they 
cost in terms of tariffs and tax?  
7. What are the labour costs involved in the imported inputs?  
8. What are the costs for storage?  
9. What are the average prices of tradeable inputs in the current Cambodian 
markets? Min and Max? Are they changed by seasons? What?  
Materials and 
method 
Material: 
 Question checklist 
 Voice recorders 
 Data templates 
Collection method: 
 Semi-structured interview: personal discussion  
Number of facilitators required: 
 Researcher only 
Activities and 
responsibility  
This interview will take place anywhere agreed or suggested by the 
respondents, and it is also according to the information from the secondary 
data. Before conducting the interview, the interviewer introduces the purposes 
of the interview and gives interviewees the right to skip or stop talking about 
sensitive issues. During the interview, the interviewer just leads the discussion 
based on the key points drafted in the question checklists.  
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6.2.2 Output prices 
Purpose -To find the global output prices to compare with the real prices received by 
Cambodian farmers.  
Respondents NGOs, government officers, importers and secondary data 
Questions 1. What are the border prices of tomatoes on average (in Vietnam and 
Thailand)? Minimum and Maximum? 
2. Are they changed by seasons? If so, what are the price inputs by seasons? 
Minimum and maximum?  
3. What are the average transportation costs per kg from the border to the 
market? Maximum and minimum?  
4. Are there any commission costs? How much?  
5. What are the cost values in relation to tariffs and tax?  
6. What are the labour costs involved in the imported inputs?  
7. What are the costs for storage?  
8. What are the average prices of tradeable inputs in the current Cambodian 
markets? Min and Max? Are they changed by seasons? What?  
9. What is the currency used for the imported inputs? What is the value 
converted into local currency (Riel)?  
Materials and 
method 
Material: 
 Question checklist 
 Voice recorders 
 Data templates 
Collection method: 
 Semi-structured interview: personal discussion  
Number of facilitator required: 
 Researcher only 
Activities and 
responsibility  
This interview will take place anywhere agreed or suggested by the 
respondents. Before conducting the interview, the interviewer introduces the 
purposes of the interview and gives the interviewees the right to skip or stop 
talking about sensitive issues. During the interview, the interviewer just leads 
the discussion based on the key points drafted in the question checklists.  
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Data template used for border budget recording in this study 
Revenue (R) per kg 
Seasons 
Average 
border 
prices in 
foreign 
currency 
Max Min 
Market 
exchange rate 
(Thai and 
Vietnam) 
Revenue in local 
currency 
=eason1      
Season2      
Season3      
Season4      
Tomato imported costs (R) per kg 
Items 
Average 
cost value in 
foreign 
currency 
Max Min 
Market 
exchange rate 
(Thai and 
Vietnam) 
Costs in local 
currency (R) 
Season 1 
Transport 
cost 
     
Labour      
Storage      
Commission      
Tax      
      
      
      
Season 2 
Transport 
cost 
     
Labour      
Storage      
Commission      
Tax      
      
      
      
Season 3 
Transport 
cost 
     
Labour      
Storage      
Commission      
Tax      
Season 4 
Transport 
cost 
     
Labour      
Storage      
Commission      
Tax      
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6.3 Social costs in relation to different governance structure perspective 
This section is prepared to measure the social costs in different governance structures following the 
contract farming models. With the purpose of comparing the performance of these models, all have 
the same questions. The target respondents for these questions are NGO experts, Ministry officers 
and other sponsors who have experienced implementing any of the models.  
Structures Questions 
Centralized 
model (vertical 
coordination) 
 
Tradeable inputs 
1. When farmers are vertically coordinated, what are tradeable inputs used 
in tomato production? Are they different from those outside the 
coordination? 
2. What are the average cost values of those inputs? Min and max? 
3. Where do farmers buy them from? How far away? How often do they 
buy? What is the travel cost per trip?  
4. Do they need to spend time searching for input suppliers? If yes, how 
many days? Is there any travel related to the search for input suppliers? 
How many times? What is the cost value per time? 
5. If they need to search for input suppliers, do they communicate via phone 
call? What is the average cost value per time? 
6. Are there any problems after buying inputs? If yes, what? How do they 
solve them? What are the costs involved in dealing with that problem?  
Non-tradeable inputs 
 Land 
7. How big is the size of land required? 
8. Do farmers rent the land for their tomato production? Are there any 
searching costs, commission and travel costs?  
 Labour 
9. To reach the supply quota given by the contracted buyer (sponsor), how 
many people are required for the tomato production?  
10. How many of them are hired? How much do farmers pay for each?  
11. Do farmers face transaction costs related to searching, commission and 
travel? (See the questions in section 5) 
12. Do you receive training from your contractors? What is it about? How long 
and how often do you join the training?  
13. Do you need to train your labour? If yes, how many days do you spend on 
it? 
 Credit 
       12. If they use credit for production capital, how do farmers know which 
credit institute to borrow from (neighbour/ NGOs/ microcredit 
staff/others)? How many days do they spend on getting credits?  
 13. Is there any phone communication? What is the average communication 
cost to get it done?  
       14. Is there any travel? How many times and how far? What is the average 
cost per trip? (Add opportunity cost) 
       15. Is there any commission involved in borrowing (village/ commune 
chief signature)?  
       16. How do they pay interest rates? Travel to the microcredit office/bank 
or via a credit officer? 
Outputs 
 Information costs affecting output prices 
 17. Searching for buyers: When to search (before/during planting or 
during harvesting period)? How many days in total (opportunity cost)?  
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 18. If they do not plant tomatoes, what do they spent their time on 
(opportunity cost)? How much can they earn per day? 
 19. Is there any travel to search for buyers? If so, how many trips? What is 
the cost per trip? How many people join the trip (opportunity cost)? Total 
costs for transportation? 
 20. Are there any phone communications? If so, how often do they call or 
message? What is the average cost per call or message? 
 Negotiation costs (during the transactions) 
 21. Do farmers transport their tomatoes to the buyers’ places? If so, what 
is the average cost per transportation (fuel)? How many people are 
involved in transporting and for how long (opportunity cost)? Total 
transportation costs including opportunity cost?  
 22. Do you buy food which is not normal for your daily life? If so, what is 
the average cost?  
 23. Are there any commission costs incurred during transportation (police 
check points)? If so, how much per transportation? 
 24. Are there any phone communications during transportation? If so, 
what is the average cost for that?  
    -What is the quality maintenance equipment needed for transportation? 
How much in total per transportation involving all buying costs 
(transportation, communication….., opportunity cost)? 
 Monitoring costs (After the transaction) 
 25. Do farmers get paid after the product is delivered? If so, how many 
days?  
 26. What are the payment methods?  
 27. Is there any travel to deal with this? What is the average cost for fuel 
and phone calls? 
             28. Are there any re-negotiations in terms of price? How are they dealt 
with? 
Transaction costs 
1. Follow the questions in the transaction cost section in the private budget 
2. In the higher governance structure, do farmers need to have document 
keeping skills? If yes, what? How much time do they spend on the 
training? 
3. List of alternative jobs and wages per day 
Additional information 
1. Is there yield uncertainty in different governances? Why?  
2. Are there any problems for farmers in relation to asset specificity 
investment? 
3. Do farmers face any writing issues due to low education? How do they 
solve them?  
Nucleus model Same questions 
Multipartite 
model (joint-
venture) 
Same questions 
Informal model Same questions 
Intermediary Same questions 
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Template used to measure the social budgets in different governance structures in this research 
Type of governance structure:………………………………………………………………… 
Output prices 
N. 
Price in the 
contract 
(R/kg) 
Transaction costs 
Total price after 
transaction costs 
subtraction (R/kg) 
Type of costs Period (days) 
Opportunity 
costs 
(Rield/days) 
How often? 
Cost per 
time? 
N. of 
people 
Total TC 
Information searching costs  
1  Searching for 
buyers 
      
2  Travel costs       
3  Phone calls       
  Negotiation costs (during the transaction of delivery) 
4  Travel costs       
5  Phone calls       
6  Commission 
costs 
      
  Monitoring costs (ex-post) 
7  Travel costs       
8  Phone calls       
9  Commission 
costs 
      
Sub-total TC       
Grand total price after transaction costs subtracted (R/kg) 
Tradeable input costs 
N. Type of inputs Quantity  Unit price Total cost (R/kg) Description of product quality standard 
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
120 
 
Sub-total tradeable input costs  
Transaction costs added to tradeable input costs 
N. 
Type of 
variables 
Period (days) 
Opportunity 
costs 
(Rield/days) 
How often? Cost per time? N. of people Total 
Additional information 
Information searching costs (ex-ante)  
 Searching for 
input suppliers 
      
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
Negotiation costs (during the transaction of delivery)  
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
Monitoring costs (ex-post)  
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
Total tradeable input costs with TC  
Non-tradeable input costs 
N. Type of inputs Quantity  Unit price Total cost (R/kg) Additional information 
 
 
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
Sub-total non-
tradable input costs 
   
N. 
Type of 
variables 
Period (days) 
Opportunity 
costs 
(Rield/days) 
How often? Cost per time? N. of people Total 
Additional information 
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Land 
Information searching costs (ex-ante)  
 Searching for 
land 
      
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Negotiation costs (during the transaction of delivery)  
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Monitoring costs   
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Labour  
Information searching costs (ex-ante)  
 Searching for 
labour 
      
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Negotiation costs (during the transaction of delivery)  
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Monitoring costs   
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Credit  
Information searching costs (ex-ante)  
122 
 
 Searching for 
lenders 
      
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Negotiation costs (during the transaction of delivery)  
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Monitoring costs   
 Travel costs       
 Phone calls       
 Commission       
Sub-total transaction costs added to non-tradeable input costs  
Total non-tradeable input costs with transactions  
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7. The analysis of competitiveness through transaction cost quantifying in the PAM approach 
 Revenues 
Costs 
Profit Tradeable 
Inputs 
Non-
tradeable 
Factors 
Private (without TC)     
Private (including TC)     
Social     
Market-based governance 
(Informal contract farming) 
    
Multipartite model (joint venture)     
Nucleus model     
Vertical coordination (centralized 
model) 
    
Effects of divergences     
Market-based governance 
(Informal contract farming) 
    
Multipartite model (joint venture)     
Nucleus model     
Vertical coordination (centralized 
model) 
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Annex 3: Focus group agenda 
Period Activities Outputs 
05 minutes 
(8:30am-8:45am) 
Introduce and explain 
the purpose of the topic 
 
90 minutes 
(8:45am-
10:15am) 
Start drawing the links 
between actors in the 
layer. Stack with 
additional information 
listed in the checklists 
-Value chain maps with key information 
o Actors (who?) 
o Value added activities (what?) 
o Distance (where?) 
o Infrastructure condition 
o Communication 
o Monetary flow 
o Information flow 
o Physical flow 
o Product flow 
o Transportation method 
o General constraints  
10 minutes Coffee and snack  
60 minutes 
(10:25am-
11:25am) 
Identify relationship 
method used in each of 
the links based on the 
maps 
-Current governance structure identified by the 
Williamson criteria: 
o Contract (verbal/written?-third party?) 
o Frequency (recurrent/occasional/once?) 
o Level of asset specificity required 
o The circumstances of opportunism/ 
uncertainty 
o (see the question checklists)  
15 minutes 
(11:25am-
11:35am) 
 
Verify the seasonal 
calendars produced by 
FAO  
-Production cycle calendar 
o Price fluctuation  
o Yield fluctuation 
o Demand fluctuation  
o Additional reasons 
90 minutes Lunch break  
30 minutes 
(13:05pm-
13:35pm) 
-List down the tradeable 
inputs required in 
tomato production 
-Discuss the costs 
- Tradeable input costs (fixed costs and variable 
costs) 
- Reasons to use those inputs 
- Efficiency of those inputs in tomato production 
 
30 minutes 
(13:35pm-
14:05pm) 
-Discuss transaction 
costs incurred in input 
transactions 
- Information about types of inputs to be used? 
How? 
- Information about potential buyers? How? 
- Information about price? 
- Price negotiation? 
- Negotiation about quality guarantee?  
- Learn how to use? 
- Farmers go to buy? 
10 minutes Coffee and snack  
30 minutes 
(14:15pm-
14:45pm) 
-Discuss non-tradeable 
factors: land, credit 
(interest rate), required 
labour  
- Cost of land for production (rental) 
- Cost burden caused by interest rates (loan) 
- Labour costs (wage) 
- Additional information 
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30 minutes 
(14:45pm-
15:15pm) 
-Discuss transaction 
costs involved in 
domestic factors 
- Search for land (how many days? travel 
(fuel/meal/number of people), commission for 
renting contract? 
- Negotiation for rental fee (phone card, middlemen 
commission, renting acknowledgement fee) 
- Loan application (how many days? travel? 
processing fee? commission for local authority: 
village/commune)   
- Loan receiving (travel? commission fee?) 
- Interest payment (travel?) 
- Application for paying off (travel? processing fee? 
commission fee?) 
- Searching for labour (travel? phone?) 
- Monitoring labour (how many days? travel? how 
many people?) 
30 minutes 
(15:15pm-
15:45pm) 
-Discuss transaction 
costs incurred in selling 
outputs  
- Searching for price, buyers, demand or quality 
(phone, travel, commission?)  
- Price negotiation (phone, travel, commission?) 
- Quality monitoring (travel, labour wage, how many 
people and days?) 
